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THE SUPREME COURT’S POST-RACIAL TURN TOWARDS A
ZERO-SUM UNDERSTANDING OF EQUALITY 
HELEN NORTON*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court—along with the rest of the country—has long
divided over the question whether the United States has yet achieved
a “post-racial” society in which race no longer matters in significant
ways. How, if at all, this debate is resolved carries enormous impli-
cations for constitutional and statutory antidiscrimination law.
Indeed, a post-racial discomfort with noticing and acting upon race
supports a zero-sum approach to equality: if race no longer matters
to the distribution of life opportunities, a decision maker’s concern for
the disparities experienced by members of one racial group may be
seen as inextricable from its intent to discriminate against others.
In recent decades, the Court’s swing Justices expressly rejected
claims of post-racial success even while moving towards an insistence
that government remain color-blind in its actual treatment of
individuals. Uncomfortable with the use of race-based classifications
to further a governmental interest in addressing long-standing racial
subordination, yet reluctant to dismiss the strength of that interest
given its view of the continuing relevance of race to American life, a
majority thus remained unwilling to treat as discriminatory govern-
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ment’s attention to racial impact when choosing among various
policy options. 
Recent developments, however, signal the possibility that the Court
has now embraced a new understanding of equality that may be
triggered by an assumption of post-racial success in certain con-
texts. For example, the Court in Ricci v. DeStefano for the first time
characterized a decision maker’s attention to its practices’ racially
disparate impact as evidence of its discriminatory, and thus unlaw-
ful, intent under Title VII. Ricci’s redefinition of culpable mental
state for antidiscrimination purposes thus destabilizes the longstand-
ing premise that the Court does not view decision makers’ attention
to race to address patterns of racial hierarchy as itself suspicious.
Decades after holding that the Equal Protection Clause does not
require government to reconsider its actions that disproportionately
exclude people of color and women so long as those actions are not
motivated by an intent to harm, the Court has now concluded that
statutory antidiscrimination law—and perhaps the Equal Protection
Clause as well—prohibits government from reconsidering these
actions under certain circumstances. If applied in the constitutional
setting, as concurring Justice Scalia predicted, such a zero-sum
understanding of equality would treat a government decision maker’s
attention to racial and gender hierarchies when choosing among
various policy options as inherently suspicious—and thus unconsti-
tutional unless the government’s action survives heightened scrutiny. 
But such a turn is by no means inevitable. Indeed, Justice
Kennedy’s swing opinions in the Court’s recent race discrimination
decisions suggest the additional possibility that the Court has not yet
determined in which direction, if any, it might turn in its under-
standing of equality. If so, opportunities remain for shaping that
turn in ways that might avoid a collision between antidiscrimi-
nation commitments. These include revisiting the social meaning of
measures that attend to the impact of various rules or standards on
protected class members when choosing among available options that
will then apply to all regardless of protected class status. Indeed,
disparate impact provisions and similar efforts play an important
role in ensuring that candidates—regardless of protected class
status—are selected on actual merit, rather than on unexamined yet
entrenched assumptions that replicate patterns of subordination at
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the expense of individual opportunity. Revisiting the social meaning
of such efforts illustrates their win-win possibilities and challenges
a zero-sum understanding of equality as ultimately impoverished.
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INTRODUCTION
Americans remain deeply divided over the question whether we
have yet achieved a “post-racial” society in which race no longer
matters in significant ways.1 Although this is by no means a new
debate,2 it has gathered considerable intensity with the election of
our first African American President.3 How, if at all, this debate is
resolved carries enormous implications for constitutional and
statutory antidiscrimination law. 
As just one example, characterizing contemporary America as
successfully post-racial undermines the central premises of dis-
parate impact theory: that racial disparities are sufficiently
suspicious to demand justification and that those disparities that
remain unjustified are morally and instrumentally unwise. To those
who believe that race is still substantially relevant to the distri-
bution of life opportunities in the United States, such attention
is morally justified, if not compelled, as well as instrumentally
desirable in that it leads to more effective outcomes, for example, in
encouraging the reconsideration of traditional yet unexamined
practices that may be poor predictors of successful job performance.4
To those who believe that the United States has largely achieved
1. Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1594 (2009) (defining “post-
racialism” as “a twenty-first-century ideology that reflects a belief that due to the significant
racial progress that has been made, the state need not engage in race-based decision-making
or adopt race-based remedies, and that civil society should eschew race as a central organizing
principle of social action”). 
2. Indeed, this debate began as early as the Reconstruction Era immediately following
the Civil War and the end of slavery. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 125
(2009) (describing debates over the wisdom and necessity of the Freedmen’s Bureau and other
efforts targeted to benefit African Americans during Reconstruction); Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L.R. 917, 973 (2009) (same). 
3. See, e.g., Ralph Richard Banks, Beyond Colorblindness: Neo-Racialism and the Future
of Race and Law Scholarship, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 41, 41-42 (2009); William Darity
Jr., Stratification Economics: Context Versus Culture and the Reparations Controversy, 57 U.
KAN. L. REV. 795, 797 (2009); Jennifer Holladay & Catherine Smith, A Cautionary Tale: The
Obama Coalition, Antisubordination Principles, and Proposition 8, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 819,
822-24 (2009); Gregory S. Parks, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Richard A. Epstein, Debate, Implicit
Race Bias and the 2008 Presidential Election: Much Ado About Nothing?, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 210, 210 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/ImplicitBias.pdf; john
a. powell, Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism?, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 785, 789 (2009). 
4. See infra notes 233-39 and accompanying text.
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post-racial success, however, such disparities trigger no great
suspicion.5 In other words, one’s view on our post-racial status
often drives what one identifies as troubling: attending to race or
not attending to race.
This divide helps explain why some see no conflict at all in an
antidiscrimination regime that bars not only intentional discrim-
ination based on race (that is, disparate treatment) but also
practices that impose unjustified racial disparities (that is, dispa-
rate impact).6 Others, in contrast, believe that the two cannot be
reconciled. Senator Jeff Sessions so concluded, for example, when
criticizing then-Judge Sotomayor’s vote that a city fire department
did not violate Title VII when it discarded the results of a test that
imposed a severe disparate impact against members of some racial
and national origin groups.7 Senator Sessions believed that the fire
department, by considering disparate impact against some, intended
to discriminate against others: “It seems to me that in Ricci, Judge
Sotomayor’s empathy for one group of firefighters turned out to be
prejudice against the others. That is, of course, the logical flaw in
the ‘empathy standard.’ Empathy for one party is always prejudice
against another.”8 A post-racial discomfort with noticing and acting
upon race supports such a zero-sum understanding of equality: if
race no longer matters, a decision maker’s concern for the dis-
parities experienced by members of one racial group (“empathy”)
inevitably includes the intent to discriminate against others
(“prejudice”).9
Further illustrating the significance of these divisions, the
Supreme Court’s swing Justices in recent decades found themselves
uncomfortable with the use of race-based classifications to further
a governmental interest in addressing long-standing racial subordi-
5. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2699 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“Standing on an equal footing, these twin pillars of Title VII advance the same objectives:
ending workplace discrimination and promoting genuinely equal opportunity.”). 
7. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
8. Confirmation Hearings of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the United States Supreme Court
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions,
Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3959&wit_id=515.
9. See Cho, supra note 1, at 1595 (describing post-racial advocates as maintaining that
“race does not matter, and should not be taken into account or even noticed”).
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nation, yet unwilling to dismiss the strength of that interest given
their view of the continuing relevance of race to American life.
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, in particular, remained reluctant
to claim complete post-racial success and thus to characterize as
inherently suspicious government’s interest in addressing unjusti-
fied racial disparities.10 While the Court increasingly moved towards
an insistence that government remain color-blind in its actual
treatment of individuals, a majority still expressly rejected post-
racial assumptions and thus remained unwilling to treat as dis-
criminatory government’s attention to racial impact when choosing
among various policy options. Examples include efforts to reduce
racial isolation by designating school attendance zones with an eye
towards neighborhood demographics,11 or to generate more diverse
applicant pools by the targeted recruitment of workers of color.12
Recent developments, however, signal the possibility that the
Court has adopted a new, zero-sum understanding of equality
that may be triggered by an assumption of post-racial success in
some contexts—an assumption that “empathy” for some groups is
inevitably accompanied by “prejudice” against others. In Ricci v.
DeStefano, for example, the Court for the first time characterized a
public employer’s attention to its practices’ racially disparate impact
as evidence of its discriminatory, and thus unlawful, intent.13 This
redefinition of culpable mental state for antidiscrimination purposes
destabilizes the long-standing premise that a majority of the Court
does not view a decision maker’s attention to its practices’ racially
disparate impact as the sort of attention to race that threatens
equality values. Decades after holding that the Equal Protection
Clause does not require government to reconsider its actions that
disproportionately exclude people of color and women so long as
those actions are not motivated by an intent to harm,14 the Court
has now concluded that statutory antidiscrimination law—and
10. See infra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.
11. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
12. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
13. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664-65 (2009) (holding that a public employer’s decision not to use
a test because of concerns about its disparate impact against members of some racial groups
constituted an act of intentional discrimination against members of other racial groups in
violation of Title VII).
14. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42 (1976).
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perhaps the Equal Protection Clause as well—prohibits government
from doing so under certain circumstances. Indeed, if applied in the
constitutional setting, as concurring Justice Scalia predicted,15 such
an understanding of equality would treat a government decision
maker’s attention to racial and gender hierarchies as inherently
suspicious—and thus unconstitutional unless the government’s
action can survive heightened scrutiny.
This Article explores the possibility—and potential consequences
—of the Court’s embrace of a post-racial view of the United States
that in turn encourages a zero-sum understanding of equality. To
that end, Part I describes the Supreme Court’s long-standing strug-
gle over a debate that turns in part on one’s assessment of the
United States’ post-racial achievement: whether antidiscrimination
law should be understood as driven by anticlassification as opposed
to antisubordination values.16 Part II then explores Ricci as a
particularly powerful illustration of the Court’s deeply divided views
over the United States’ post-racial status, examining in detail the
strikingly differing narratives offered by the majority and the
dissent. 
The remaining Parts consider several different directions in
which the Court might take its antidiscrimination jurisprudence.
Part III first examines the possibility that the Court has taken a
significant turn towards a zero-sum understanding of equality that
treats a decision maker’s attention to racial hierarchies as inher-
ently suspicious for antidiscrimination law purposes. It then ex-
plores what such a turn might mean for equal protection law: the
potential constitutional end of statutory disparate impact standards
and perhaps also of an even wider range of important responses to
government’s self-analysis of the racial or gender impact of its
actions. Examples include public schools’ efforts to increase the
15. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682-83 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he war between disparate
impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin
thinking about how—and on what terms—to make peace between them.”). 
16. As discussed in detail infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text, anticlassification
theorists identify race-based differentials in treatment as inherently offensive to equality
values regardless of their motivation or effect, whereas antisubordination advocates urge that
antidiscrimination law should instead be understood as barring those actions that have the
intent or the effect of perpetuating traditional patterns of racial subordination, but not those
race-based actions that undermine such hierarchies.
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admission of students of color through the use of facially race-
neutral criteria like economic disadvantage or high school class
rank, or government’s choice to fund certain health initiatives to
address racial or gender disparities in access to or quality of health
care.17 
Part IV considers alternatives that understand the Court as
signaling a less pronounced turn. More specifically, it examines
Justice Kennedy’s swing opinions in the Court’s recent race
discrimination decisions as suggesting the possibility that the Court
has not yet determined in which direction, if any, it might turn in
its understanding of equality. For example, the Court may view
actions motivated by a decision maker’s interest in ameliorating
racial disparities with suspicion only when those actions make
identifiable third parties worse off in tangible ways, because at that
point, and not until that point, it sees the costs of attending to race
for antisubordination ends as outweighing its benefits.
Part V then explores opportunities for shaping the Court’s
approach to equality to avoid a collision between antidiscrimination
commitments. These might include a renewed debate over the social
meaning of measures that attend to the impact of various rules or
standards on protected class members when choosing among
available options that will then apply to all, regardless of protected
class status. More specifically, Part V examines the role that
disparate impact standards and similar efforts play in ensuring that
candidates—regardless of protected class status—are selected on
actual merit rather than on unexamined yet entrenched assump-
tions that replicate patterns of subordination at the expense of
individual opportunity. It also explores the social welfare benefits
of measures that rely on racial or gender disparities to trigger
reconsideration of what may be poor measures of ability for choosing
among candidates for public safety leadership roles and other
important positions. Revisiting the social meaning of such efforts
illustrates their win-win possibilities and challenges a zero-sum
understanding of equality as ultimately impoverished.
17. See infra notes 148, 150 and accompanying text.
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I. TWO COMPETING VIEWS OF EQUALITY
Courts, policymakers, and scholars have long struggled with a
vigorous and perhaps intractable debate: whether antidiscrim-
ination law should be understood as driven by antisubordination as
opposed to anticlassification values.18 Antisubordination advocates
urge that the Equal Protection Clause should be understood to bar
those government actions that have the intent or the effect of
perpetuating traditional patterns of hierarchy.19 Under this view,
government actions that seek to undermine such hierarchies,
including those expressly based on race, do not offend antidiscrim-
ination values.20 This approach thus finds “no moral or constitu-
tional equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate
a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordina-
tion.”21 
18. Although this Part focuses on competing understandings of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, this debate is relevant to understanding other
antidiscrimination commitments as well. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 202-04 (1979) (characterizing Title VII as primarily motivated by Congress’s
antisubordination ends); id. at 219-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (characterizing Title VII as
animated by anticlassification objectives). James Gray Pope, moreover, has described
similarly competing understandings of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on
involuntary servitude. James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the
Constitutional Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1496-99 (2010). 
19. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, and
Community (A Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114 YALE
L.J. 1353, 1395 (2005) (“[The Equal Protection Clause] creates a new substantive value of
‘nonslavery’ and antisubordination to replace the old values of slavery and white
supremacy.”); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values
in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472-73 (2004) (describing
the antisubordination principle as “the conviction that it is wrong for the state to engage in
practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups”).
20. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
147-57 (1976) (urging a “group-disadvantaging” interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
that attends to racial groups’ varying experience of disadvantage in American life); Cass R.
Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2455 (1994) (advocating an
“anticaste” understanding of the Equal Protection Clause that “forbids social and legal
practices from turning highly visible but morally irrelevant differences into a basis for second-
class citizenship”).
21. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 864 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Equal Protection Clause, ratified following the Civil War, has
always distinguished in practice between state action that excludes and thereby subordinates
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Those who urge an anticlassification understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause, in contrast, take the view that the Constitution
prohibits government from “[r]educ[ing] an individual to an as-
signed racial identity for differential treatment.”22 They thus
consider differential race-based treatment as uniformly morally and
legally repugnant regardless of motive.23 Under this approach,
moreover, the government’s facially neutral actions that impose
severe racial disparities do not offend antidiscrimination values
unless the government intended such harmful effects.24 
Among the clearer illustrations of this divide25 is the contrast
between the opinions of Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Roberts
when considering the constitutionality of governments’ race-based
efforts to ameliorate racial disparities in various educational
contexts. Justice Blackmun’s assessment that the United States’
post-racial aspirations have yet to be achieved led him to the
antisubordination conclusion that “[i]n order to get beyond racism,
we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in
order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently.
We cannot—we dare not—let the Equal Protection Clause perpetu-
racial minorities and state action that seeks to bring together people of all races.”); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Actions designed to burden
groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to
hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its aftereffects have been extirpated.”);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 551-52 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“A
profound difference separates governmental actions that themselves are racist, and
governmental actions that seek to remedy the effects of prior racism or to prevent neutral
governmental activity from perpetuating the effects of such racism.”).
22. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
23. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 132-33 (1975); Morris B.
Abram, Commentary, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1312, 1312 (1986); Kenneth L. Marcus, The War Between Disparate Impact and Equal
Protection, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 53, 55-56; Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the
Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 25.
24. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (describing
anticlassification theory as holding “that government may not classify people either overtly
or surreptitiously on the basis of ... race”). 
25. Anticlassification and antisubordination theories are not always in tension. The
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), for example, can be
justified on both grounds, as school segregation involved an express race-based classification
that perpetuated traditional racial hierarchies. 
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ate racial supremacy.”26 Chief Justice Roberts, however, insisted
simply: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race.”27 Justice Scalia similarly
declared: “In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It
is American.”28 
Anticlassification adherents have long described their views as
driven not only by instrumental concerns that race-based classifica-
tions stigmatize beneficiaries and exacerbate racial divisions,29 but
also by the moral commands of colorblindness: “The Constitution
abhors classifications based on race, not only because those clas-
sifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate
motives, but also because every time the government places citizens
on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of
burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”30 In other words, under this
26. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 403, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (“I yield to no one in my earnest hope that the time will come when an ‘affirmative
action’ program is unnecessary and is, in truth, only a relic of the past. I would hope that we
could reach this stage within a decade at the most. But the story of Brown v. Board of
Education, decided almost a quarter of a century ago, suggests that that hope is a slim one.”)
(citation omitted).
27. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (plurality opinion). Chief Justice Roberts was more
equivocal about race-conscious measures in the voting rights context. See Nw. Austin Mun.
Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2516 (2009) (“More than 40 years ago, this Court
concluded that ‘exceptional conditions’ prevailing in certain parts of the country justified
extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our federal system. In part due to the
success of that legislation, we are now a very different Nation. Whether conditions continue
to justify such legislation is a difficult constitutional question we do not answer today.”)
(citation omitted). 
28. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
29. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 759 (Thomas, J., concurring) (maintaining that
government’s race-based classification “is precisely the sort of government action that pits the
races against one another, exacerbates racial tension, and ‘provoke[s] resentment among
those who believe that they have been wronged by the government’s use of race’” (quoting
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241)); id. at 761-66 (contesting educational benefits of government’s
attention to race in student assignments and maintaining that race-based classifications of
any sort tend to entrench further race discrimination). 
30. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (“One of the principal
reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth
of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential
qualities.”); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (“[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to
demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial
classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial
scrutiny.”); id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[U]nder
our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept
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view, it is morally wrong to consider race because race shouldn’t
matter.
As Sumi Cho explains, such a commitment to colorblindness
“offers a largely normative claim for a retreat from race that is
aspirational in nature.”31 But anticlassification theory also finds
support in post-racial understandings that conclude, as a descriptive
matter, that the United States has achieved “a racially transcendent
event that authorizes the retreat from race.”32 Under a post-racial
view, it is not only wrong but also irrelevant and counterproductive
to consider race because race doesn’t matter any more in significant
ways.33 Some characterize the post-racial view as essentially
optimistic.34 Others see such an approach as ignoring or masking
continuing racism.35 
is alien to the Constitution’s focus upon the individual, and its rejection of dispositions based
on race, or based on blood.”) (citations omitted). 
31. Cho, supra note 1, at 1598.
32. Id. at 1597-98.
33. See id. at 1595 (“[O]ne who points out racial inequities risks being characterized as
an obsessed-with-race racist who is unfairly and divisively ‘playing the race card’—one who
occupies the same moral category as someone who consciously perpetrates racial inequities.”);
powell, supra note 3, at 789 (“[Under a post-racial view, race] is not just a distraction, it is a
divisive [sic]. The alternative to this old, tired battle is post-racialism. The question of where
we are with regard to race then becomes binary. We are either in a divisive space from the
past where we continue to assert the dominance of conscious racism, or we are in a post-racial
world where race really does not matter to most Americans.”). 
34. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2525 (2009) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“Admitting that a prophylactic law as broad as section 5 [of the Voting Rights
Act] is no longer constitutionally justified based on current evidence of discrimination is not
a sign of defeat. It is an acknowledgment of victory.”); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection
and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 559 (2003) (“The individualist
impulse in equal protection thus offers an escape from confronting the depressing degree to
which race influences the lives of members of historically subordinated groups. It invites us
instead to bathe in a sunnier worldview informed by ideals of universal human potential.”).
35. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 24, at 31 (“By reinterpreting and remembering the
civil rights movement through the formalist lens of anticlassification, white America could
more easily believe that racial inequality was a thing of the past; and that it had done—and
nobly done—everything it needed to do to make whites and blacks equal citizens before the
law.”); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2
(1991) (arguing that “color-blind constitutionalism ... fosters white racial domination”);
Martha Minow, After Brown: What Would Martin Luther King Say?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 599, 600 (2008) (“[P]retending to have achieved color-blind as well as open opportunity
—when we have not—disables individuals and communities from understanding what is going
on and from becoming equipped to deal with it.”).
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Whether one adopts an anticlassification or antisubordination
interpretation of equality law thus may turn on one’s view of the
continuing relevance, if any, of race to American life.36 This, of
course, is a long-standing debate for the Court37 as well as for the
rest of the country.38 
To be sure, anticlassification rationales have increasingly com-
manded a majority of the contemporary Court. In Washington v.
Davis, for example, the Court concluded that the Constitution does
not require government attention to the racial disparities created by
its facially neutral actions, even if such disparities have the effect
of reinforcing traditional racial hierarchies.39 Rejecting an equal
protection challenge to the District of Columbia’s examination for
police officers that had the effect of disproportionately excluding
African Americans from such positions, the Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause addresses only intentionally discriminatory
government actions.40 Along the same lines, the Court later demon-
strated an anticlassification suspicion of affirmative action pro-
grams’ consideration of race to expand opportunities for people of
color in government contracting and elsewhere.41 It thus ruled that
the Equal Protection Clause requires strict scrutiny of any inten-
36. But not necessarily. As discussed infra note 58, Justices Scalia and Thomas (and
perhaps other Justices) ascribe to an anticlassification view on moral and instrumental
grounds regardless of their assessment of the United States’ post-racial status. 
37. Compare The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (“When a man has emerged
from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he
takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when
his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other
men’s rights are protected.”), with id. at 61-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“It is, I submit,
scarcely just to say that the colored race has been the special favorite of the laws.... To-day,
it is the colored race which is denied, by corporations and individuals wielding public
authority, rights fundamental in their freedom and citizenship.”).
38. See powell, supra note 3, at 792-93 (“Why is it divisive to focus on race-specific
programs or talk about race? The stock explanation is that race does not matter. But even if
race does not matter why is such an approach seen as divisive? The very intensity of racial
feelings in our society belies the assertion that race does not matter.”).
39. 426 U.S. 229, 238-42 (1976). 
40. Id. at 239-41. 
41. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (“[A]ny person, of
whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the
Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment
under the strictest judicial scrutiny.”).
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tional governmental race-based treatment, regardless of whether
that decision was motivated by a desire to undermine, rather than
perpetuate, traditional patterns of racial subordination.42 
At the same time, however, the swing Justices remained reluctant
to choose between these competing understandings of the Equal
Protection Clause. Frequently uncomfortable with government’s
use of race-based classifications to further an antisubordination
interest, they nevertheless found themselves unwilling to dismiss
the strength of that interest given their resistance to declaring
post-racial victory. Thus, while the Court increasingly insisted that
government remain color-blind in its actual treatment of individu-
als, a majority still remained unwilling to characterize government’s
interest in addressing racial disparities as itself inherently suspi-
cious. 
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, for example, Justice
O’Connor’s majority opinion took the anticlassification view that
whenever government engages in differential race-based treatment,
such means are sufficiently suspicious to trigger strict scrutiny
regardless of its antisubordination end.43 The Court thus remanded
for evaluation under this demanding standard a federal affirm-
ative action program that provided financial incentives for con-
tracting with minority-owned businesses.44 At the same time,
however, Justice O’Connor refused to declare post-racial victory:
“The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering
effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this
country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disquali-
fied from acting in response to it.”45 She thus took pains to preserve
the possibility that antisubordination interests could justify gov-
ernment’s race-based treatment by emphasizing that such programs
might survive strict scrutiny.46 
42. Id. at 235 (holding that strict scrutiny applies to all race-based action by the federal
government); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (applying strict
scrutiny to all race-based action by state and local governments).
43. 515 U.S. at 235.
44. Id. at 204-05.
45. Id. at 237.
46. Id. (“Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but
fatal in fact.’” (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring))). 
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She reiterated her rejection of post-racial assumptions in Grutter
v. Bollinger, when she cast the decisive vote to uphold a public law
school’s consideration of race as a plus-factor in its admissions
program to achieve a diverse student body: “Just as growing up in
a particular region or having particular professional experiences is
likely to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s own, unique
experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in
which race unfortunately still matters.”47 Further demonstrating
her ambivalence, however, she famously went on to predict post-
racial success—and thus the end of a need for race-based means to
achieve antisubordination ends—by the year 2028: “We expect that
25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today.”48
More recently, Justice Kennedy sought to claim space between
the poles of pure anticlassification and antisubordination theory
with his separate opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District No. 1.49 On one hand, he cast the fifth vote
to strike down, on equal protection grounds, public school districts’
use of race as a factor to be considered when assigning students to
elementary and high schools. In so doing, he emphasized his abhor-
rence for race-based classifications on both moral50 and instrumen-
tal51 grounds.
On the other hand, his explicit unwillingness to claim post-racial
victory led him to write separately to emphasize the strength of
government’s continuing interest in addressing patterns of subordi-
nation: 
47.  539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003); see also id. at 337-38 (“With respect to the use of race itself,
all underrepresented minority students admitted by the Law School have been deemed
qualified. By virtue of our Nation’s struggle with racial inequality, such students are both
likely to have experiences of particular importance to the Law School’s mission, and less likely
to be admitted in meaningful numbers on criteria that ignore those experiences.”).
48. Id. at 343.
49. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
50. Id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“To be forced to live
under a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our
society. And it is a label that an individual is powerless to change.”).
51. Id. (“Governmental classifications that command people to march in different
directions based on racial typologies can cause a new divisiveness. The practice can lead to
corrosive discourse, where race serves not as an element of our diverse heritage but instead
as a bargaining chip in the political process.”).
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The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is
that too often it does.
... The plurality’s postulate that “[t]he way to stop discrimina-
tion on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race,” is not sufficient to decide these cases. Fifty years of
experience since Brown v. Board of Education should teach us
that the problem before us defies so easy a solution.... 
The statement by Justice Harlan that “[o]ur Constitution is
color-blind” was most certainly justified in the context of his
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. The Court’s decision in that case
was a grievous error it took far too long to overrule. Plessy, of
course, concerned official classification by race applicable to all
persons who sought to use railway carriages. And, as an
aspiration, Justice Harlan’s axiom must command our assent. In
the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal
constitutional principle.52 
To achieve the government’s compelling antisubordination ends,
he thus urged that school authorities should remain 
free to devise race-conscious measures to address the problem in
a general way and without treating each student in different
fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by
race.
... Executive and legislative branches, which for generations
now have considered these types of policies and procedures,
should be permitted to employ them with candor and with
confidence that a constitutional violation does not occur when-
ever a decisionmaker considers the impact a given approach
might have on students of different races.53
52. Id. at 787-88 (citations omitted). Similarly, in the voting rights context, Justice
Kennedy’s plurality opinion rejected the African American plaintiffs’ Voting Rights Act
challenge on statutory grounds but held back from declaring post-racial victory. See Bartlett
v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1249 (2009) (“Some commentators suggest that racially
polarized voting is waning—as evidenced by, for example, the election of minority candidates
where a majority of voters are white. Still, racial discrimination and racially polarized voting
are not ancient history. Much remains to be done to ensure that citizens of all races have
equal opportunity to share and participate in our democratic processes and traditions.”)
(citations omitted); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 435
(2006) (concluding that Texas’s decision to dismantle a congressional district where Latinos
“had found an efficacious political identity” violated the Voting Rights Act).
53. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). 
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As a normative matter, Justice Kennedy shared anticlassification
advocates’ moral and instrumental condemnation of race-based
differences in treatment. But he rejected both a descriptive post-
racial claim that race no longer significantly shapes the distribution
of American life opportunities as well as its normative conclusion
that we thus need not, and should not, attend to race. Indeed, he
identified a range of race-conscious means to achieve antisub-
ordination ends that he considered insufficiently suspicious to
trigger strict scrutiny.54 These included “strategic site selection of
new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of
the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special
programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and
tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.”55 
In short, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy expressly rejected post-
racial assumptions to help form a majority of the Court willing to
credit the strength of government’s antisubordination interests in
two important contexts. First, they characterized such interests as
sufficiently compelling to justify certain race-based differentials in
treatment even under strict scrutiny.56 Second, they considered such
interests to be insufficiently suspicious to trigger strict scrutiny
when they inspired governmental means other than race-based
differences in treatment.57 These swing Justices thus distanced
themselves from other anticlassification theorists on the Court by
refusing to treat government’s interest in undermining racial
54. Id. at 789 (“These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different
treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race,
so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible.”).
55. Id.
56. Note, however, that Justice O’Connor proved considerably more willing than Justice
Kennedy—at least to date—to apply that principle in practice to uphold government’s
consideration of race. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333-40 (O’Connor, J.,
writing for the majority) (finding that the University of Michigan Law School’s consideration
of race in admissions was sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny), with id. at
388-92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (concluding that the law school’s program was not narrowly
tailored and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause).
57. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507, 509-10 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (suggesting the constitutionality of facially neutral efforts to achieve
government’s interest in addressing racial disparities). 
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hierarchy as equally troubling as an interest in perpetuating
patterns of subordination.58 
This brings us to Ricci v. DeStefano, which now raises questions
about antisubordination theory’s continuing ability to command a
majority of the Court on at least the second of these premises. There
Justice Kennedy cast the fifth vote to treat a decision maker’s
consideration of its practices’ racially disparate impact as evidence
of its discriminatory, and thus presumptively unlawful, intent.59 In
a decision that may also have constitutional implications, Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion newly characterized as suspicious for
statutory purposes the institutional frame of mind that he had
previously appeared to endorse: an interest in addressing unjusti-
fied racial disparities in recognition that race still too often matters. 
II. TWO COMPETING VIEWS OF RICCI
Title VII’s disparate treatment provision prohibits employers
from intentionally treating employees or applicants less favorably
because of their race, sex, color, religion, or national origin.60 In
addition, Title VII’s disparate impact provision prohibits an
employer from using an employment practice that disproportion-
ately excludes or disadvantages protected class members unless the
employer can “validate” the practice—that is, unless it can show
that the practice is “job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity.”61 If the contested practice takes
the form of an examination, the employer must show not only that
the examination tests for knowledge or skills necessary for success-
ful job performance, but also that its use of cut-off or rank-order
58. Cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (“In my view, government can never have a
‘compelling interest’ in discriminating on the basis of race in order to ‘make up’ for past racial
discrimination in the opposite direction.”); id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“I believe that there is a ‘moral [and] constitutional equivalence,’
between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of
race in order to foster some current notion of equality.”) (citation omitted). Justices Scalia and
Thomas (and perhaps other Justices) thus ascribe to an anticlassification view on moral and
instrumental grounds, regardless of their assessment of America’s post-racial status. 
59. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006); see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
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scores to screen candidates reliably sorts candidates based on
ability.62 Even if the employer succeeds with this showing, its
decision to maintain the practice still violates Title VII if the
plaintiff can prove the existence of a less discriminatory alter-
native.63 Although the employer’s state of mind—that is, its intent
to discriminate based on race or another protected characteristic—is
a key element of a disparate treatment claim,64 such intent is not at
all required in a disparate impact claim.65 
At the end of 2003, the New Haven Fire Department adminis-
tered promotional examinations to fill vacancies in the positions of
Captain and Lieutenant.66 The collective bargaining agreement
between the city and the New Haven firefighters’ union required
that any promotional examination include both a written and oral
component, weighted to comprise 60% and 40%, respectively, of the
applicant’s total score.67 The city’s merit system then required the
New Haven Civil Service Board to certify the test results before the
promotional process could proceed.68 The City Charter’s “Rule of
Three” then mandated that only the three applicants with the
highest exam scores would be eligible for promotion to each
vacancy.69
The pass rate for the white candidates who took the Captain
exam was 64%, compared to 37.5% for both the African American
and Latino candidates.70 The pass rate for whites taking the
Lieutenant exam was 58.1%, compared to 31.6% for African
American candidates and 20% for Latino candidates.71 The “Rule of
Three”—which required that successful candidates have one of the
top three scores on the exam—meant that the top ten scorers on the
Lieutenant exam would have been eligible for promotion to the
62. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(H) (2009) (“Where cut off scores are used, they should normally
be set so as to be reasonable and consistent with normal expectations of acceptable proficiency
within the work force.”).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C).
64. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (stating that “[p]roof of discriminatory motive is
critical” in disparate treatment cases).
65. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
66. Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (D. Conn. 2006).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 144.
69. Id. at 145.
70. See id.
71. See id.
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eight Lieutenant vacancies, and that the top nine scorers on the
Captain exam would have been eligible for promotion to the seven
Captain vacancies.72 As a result of this rank-order rule, no African
Americans or Latinos would have been eligible for promotion to the
position of Lieutenant.73 No African Americans and only two Latinos
would have been eligible for promotion to the position of Captain.74 
Although all parties agreed that the tests at issue thus imposed
a severe disparate impact upon African American and Latino
firefighters,75 considerable controversy remained over the tests’
accuracy in identifying the best candidates for promotion and the
availability of less discriminatory alternatives that might better
measure leadership ability.76 Citing concerns that the examinations
were vulnerable to Title VII challenge in light of their disparate
impact and uncertainty over their validity,77 the city declined to
certify the test results, and no firefighter was promoted.78 The
plaintiffs—a group of test-takers who received high scores on the
examinations—argued that the public employer’s refusal to use a
test because of its impact against members of some racial and
national origin79 groups constituted an act of intentional discrimina-
tion against members of other groups for both equal protection and
Title VII purposes.80 
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. 
75. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677-78 (2009).
76. See id. at 2667-71. Concerns about the examinations included the city’s failure to
consider any methods other than the testing regime outlined in the collective bargaining
agreement, the failure to justify the 60/40 weighting ratio between the written and oral
exams, questions about access to study materials, concerns about the failure to vet the tests
with local reviewers familiar with New Haven firefighting practice, and the availability of
alternatives like the risk assessment centers used by most other fire departments. See infra
notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
77. Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 150.
78. Id.
79. Note that national origin is among the characteristics protected by statutory and
constitutional antidiscrimination law and, indeed, the practice at issue in Ricci imposed
substantial disparate impact on the basis of national origin as well as race. See supra notes
70-75 and accompanying text. In the interest of brevity, this Article sometimes uses “race” as
shorthand for “race and national origin.” 
80. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2671.
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The federal district court granted the city’s summary judgment
motion,81 and the Second Circuit affirmed.82 Addressing only the
Title VII question, a 5-4 Supreme Court reversed, and instead
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs.83 
The various opinions in the Supreme Court offer strikingly
different narratives that provide a particularly powerful illustration
of the Court’s continuing divide over the extent to which the United
States has successfully achieved post-racial status. Those Justices
joining the majority, for example, delivered short, simple factual
narratives that began and ended with the individual plaintiffs. As
concurring Justice Alito wrote:
Petitioners are firefighters who seek only a fair chance to
move up the ranks in their chosen profession. In order to qualify
for promotion, they made personal sacrifices.
... Petitioners were denied promotions for which they qualified
because of the race and ethnicity of the firefighters who achieved
the highest scores on the City’s exam.84
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent told a considerably longer story that
started much earlier in both national and local history. She viewed
the history of race discrimination by local governments generally,
and in New Haven in particular, as an essential part of the
narrative: “Firefighting is a profession in which the legacy of racial
discrimination casts an especially long shadow.”85 In contrast to
Justice Kennedy’s brief and acontextual recitation of the disparate
impact standard in the majority opinion,86 Justice Ginsburg then
described in detail the development of disparate impact law in
response to such long-standing racial hierarchies.87 She concluded:
81. Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
82. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87, 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
83. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681. I served pro bono as counsel of record to amici in support of
the City of New Haven in this case. See Brief of the National Partnership for Women &
Families et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (Nos. 07-
1428 and 08-328). 
84. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2689 (Alito, J., concurring). 
85. Id. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2690-91 (recounting legislative
history describing municipalities’ long history of racism that led Congress to expand Title VII
to cover state and local government employers). 
86. See id. at 2672-73 (majority opinion).
87. Id. at 2696-99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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“It is against this backdrop of entrenched inequality that the
promotion process at issue in this litigation should be assessed.”88 
The narratives differ strikingly not only in their starting points,
but also in their causal complexity. The Ricci majority repeatedly
characterized New Haven as “reject[ing] the test results solely
because the higher scoring candidates were white.”89 The dissent, in
contrast, treated the city’s decision as motivated instead by concern
about the exams’ ability to identify successful leaders—concern, to
be sure, triggered by the tests’ racially disparate impact as Title VII
requires: 
Infecting the Court’s entire analysis is its insistence that the
City rejected the test results “in sole reliance upon race-based
statistics.” But as the part of the story the Court leaves out so
plainly shows—the long history of rank discrimination against
African Americans in the firefighting profession, the multiple
flaws in New Haven’s test for promotions—“sole reliance” on
statistics certainly is not descriptive of the ... decision.90
 
The opinions differ further in their assessments of the reason-
ableness of test-takers’ expectations, based in part on the Justices’
differing levels of confidence in traditional measures of merit. The
majority focused on the time and effort invested by high-scoring
test-takers: “Examinations like those administered by the City
create legitimate expectations on the part of those who took the
tests. As is the case with any promotion exam, some of the
firefighters here invested substantial time, money, and personal
commitment in preparing for the tests.”91 The dissent, however,
maintained that
88. Id. at 2691.
89. Id. at 2674 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2673 (“All the evidence demonstrates that
the City chose not to certify the examination results because of the statistical disparity based
on race—i.e., how minority candidates had performed when compared to white candidates.”);
id. at 2676 (“Here, however, the firefighters saw their efforts invalidated by the City in sole
reliance upon race-based statistics.”). At one point, however, the majority opinion appeared
to hedge its characterization of the city as acting “solely” because of racial disparities. See id.
at 2681 (“[A]fter the tests were completed, the raw racial results became the predominant
rationale for the City’s refusal to certify the results.”).
90. Id. at 2702 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 2676 (majority opinion).
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[t]he legitimacy of an employee’s expectation depends on the
legitimacy of the selection method. If an employer reasonably
concludes that an exam fails to identify the most qualified
individuals and needlessly shuts out a segment of the applicant
pool, Title VII surely does not compel the employer to hire or
promote based on the test, however unreliable it may be. Indeed,
the statute’s prime objective is to prevent exclusionary practices
from “operat[ing] to ‘freeze’ the status quo.”92 
The dissent further emphasized that—in contrast to New Haven’s
examination, which relied only on a paper-and-pencil test and an
oral interview to evaluate leadership potential—most fire depart-
ments use assessment centers that evaluate candidates for super-
visory positions by requiring them to respond to hypothetical
emergency and personnel management scenarios through inter-
views, group discussions, and written and other exercises as more
accurate measures of leadership ability.93 
Not surprisingly, the strikingly different narratives led to very
different conclusions, both as to the appropriate standard to be
applied as well as to the proper application of that standard. The
majority “conclude[d] that race-based action like the City’s in this
case is impermissible under Title VII unless the employer can
demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the
action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact
statute.”94 The dissent, in contrast, would permit an employer to
“jettison[ ]” a particular practice for choosing among candidates
when its disproportionate racial impact becomes apparent, so long
as it had “good cause” to believe that such an impact was unjusti-
fied—in other words, that it had evidence indicating the device’s
invalidity or the availability of less discriminatory alternatives.95 
92. Id. at 2702 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
430 (1971)).
93. Id. at 2704-05 (describing 1996 study indicating that two-thirds of municipalities used
assessment centers for promotional decisions and that those cities that still relied on written
examinations weighted them much less heavily than did New Haven); see also id. at 2706
(quoting Chad Legel, the New Haven test developer, as testifying that because he had been
instructed to rely exclusively on a written and oral exam, his exams “had not even attempted
to assess ‘command presence’ ... ‘[Y]ou would probably be better off with an assessment center
if you cared to measure that.’”).
94. Id. at 2664 (majority opinion).
95. Id. at 2699 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Nor did the Justices agree as to how the new strong-basis-in-
evidence standard should apply to the facts at hand, primarily
because of their entirely different assessments of evidence that the
tests did not accurately predict job performance and that less
discriminatory alternatives existed. The majority repeatedly dis-
missed such evidence as insufficient96 and at one point as entirely
nonexistent: “[T]here is no evidence—let alone the required strong
basis in evidence—that the tests were flawed because they were not
job-related or because other, equally valid and less discriminatory
tests were available to the City.”97 It thus awarded summary judg-
ment to the plaintiffs.98
The dissent, on the other hand, would have granted summary
judgment to the city even under the majority’s strong-basis-in-
evidence rule. In concluding that the city had a strong basis to
believe that its examination was invalid, the dissent emphasized the
city’s failure to consider any methods other than “the testing regime
outlined in its two-decades-old contract with the local firefighters’
union,”99 the failure to justify the 60/40 weighting ratio between the
written and oral exam,100 questions about access to study
materials,101 concerns about the failure to vet the tests with local
reviewers familiar with New Haven firefighting practice,102 and the
availability of alternatives like the risk assessment centers used by
most other fire departments.103
In short, it’s hard to believe that the opinions describe the same
case.104 
96. See id. at 2678 (majority opinion) (“There is no genuine dispute that the examinations
were job-related and consistent with business necessity.”); id. at 2677 (“[T]he record makes
clear there is no support for the conclusion that respondents had an objective, strong basis in
evidence to find the tests inadequate.”); id. at 2679 (“Respondents also lacked a strong basis
in evidence of an equally valid, less-discriminatory testing alternative.”).
97. Id. at 2681.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2691-92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2699 n.5 (“What was the ‘business necessity’ for the tests New Haven used? How
could one justify, e.g., the 60/40 written/oral ratio under that standard? Neither the Court nor
the concurring opinions attempt to defend the ratio.”) (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 2706.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2704-05.
104. Adding to the narrative possibilities, Justice Alito’s concurrence argued that a
reasonable jury could conclude that New Haven was motivated not by an interest in avoiding
liability for its practices’ disparate impact, but instead by an illegitimate desire to “placate
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As others have observed, the Court’s antidiscrimination decisions
frequently feature such dramatically varying narratives.105 Possible
explanations for these differences include political affiliation106 or
the continuing battle between formalists’ preference for bright-line
rules and realists’ affinity for flexible standards.107 Other explana-
tions include variations in outsiders’ and insiders’ perception of
discrimination108 or differences in attributing outcomes to structural
as opposed to individual causes, such as reliance on situationism as
a politically important racial constituency.” Id. at 2684 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito’s
narrative parallels Kim Forde-Mazrui’s earlier explanation of some of the Court’s
antidiscrimination decisions: 
The Court’s normative vision that race is irrelevant, or at least should be treated
as such by government, seems to underlie a further concern of the Court over the
use of racial classifications, namely, ‘racial politics’.... Although the Court [in
Croson] does not explain what it means by simple racial politics, the concern
seems to be over the enactment of race-based laws simply to appease a racial
group instead of laws designed to promote a “genuine public interest.” 
Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88
GEO. L.J. 2331, 2356 (2000) (referencing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989)).
105. Paula Monopoli, for example, contrasted Justice Alito’s “detached” description of the
facts in the majority opinion in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007),
a Title VII pay discrimination case, with dissenting Justice Ginsburg’s “less distant,”
“powerful” recitation. Paula A. Monopoli, In a Different Voice: Lessons from Ledbetter, 34 J.C.
& U.L. 555, 562-63 (2008). For a description of the varying narratives featured in the Court’s
labor and employment cases more generally, see Paul Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work,
38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 27, on file with the author).
106. See Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary
Colorblindness, 59 STAN L. REV. 985, 1006-12 (2007) (describing the political divisions
between anticlassification and antisubordination theorists); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL.,
ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 150 (2006) (“In
many domains, Republican appointees vote very differently from Democratic appointees.”).
107. See Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics of Collapse),
95 IOWA L. REV. 195, 238-39 (2009) (asserting that judges’ differing factual narratives may
indicate their preferences for rules as opposed to standards and are a “localized variant” of
the battle between formalism and realism: “Notice what Holmes and Cardozo have done.
Their pro-rule and pro-standards positions, respectively, have already been prefigured at the
level of the evidentiary and operative facts.”). 
108. See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1093
(2008) (“Differences in perception have profound implications for how our judicial machinery,
which consists predominantly of white male judges, resolves antidiscrimination claims.
Judges are likely to impose their own contingent conceptions of discrimination, with little or
no awareness of the perceptual limitations shaping their judgments.”); see also Deborah L.
Brake, Perceiving Subtle Sexism: Mapping the Social-Psychological Forces and Legal
Narratives that Obscure Gender Bias, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 679, 679-87 (2007) (similar
agreement). 
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opposed to dispositionism in explaining human behavior109 or one’s
adherence to “just world theory.”110 Dan Kahan, for example, has
extensively explored how judges (and others) frequently “resolve
disputed facts in a manner supportive of their group identities.”111
Without discounting the possibility that any or all of these
dynamics may be at work, the differing narratives may also be
explained as reflecting a substantive disagreement: the Court’s
deeply divided views over the meaning of equality, which in turn
may be informed by a divided empirical assessment of the United
States’ post-racial status. The next Part explores this possibility.
III. THE COURT’S POTENTIAL TURN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
The Ricci majority made at least two deeply contested moves.
First, it newly defined an employer’s culpable mental state for Title
VII purposes, concluding that an employer’s attention to its prac-
tices’ racially disparate impact is itself evidence of its racially
discriminatory intent.112 Although Title VII’s separate disparate
109. See Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent
Views of Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 314 (2008)
(contrasting “dispositionism”—which explains outcomes and behaviors in terms of individuals’
personalities and preferences—and “situationism”—which often ascribes outcomes and
behaviors to forces and influences external to the individual).
110. Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-
Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 891 (2008) (“Certain widely held belief systems
encourage the denial of individualized discrimination, particularly the belief in a just world,
the ideology of individual responsibility, and the reluctance to blame others.”). 
111. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going To
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838
(2009); see also id. at 842-43 (“Social psychology teaches us that our perceptions of fact are
pervasively shaped by our commitments to shared but contested views of individual virtue
and social justice. It also tells us that although our ability to perceive this type of value-
motivated cognition in others is quite acute, our power to perceive it in ourselves tends to be
quite poor.”). For an application of Kahan’s theories to the Court’s labor and employment
decisions, see Secunda, supra note 105, at 34.
112. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009) (“The question is not whether the
conduct was discriminatory but whether the City had a lawful justification for its race-based
action.”); id. at 2673 (“Our analysis begins with this premise: The City’s actions would violate
the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid defense. All the evidence
demonstrates that the City chose not to certify the examination results because of the
statistical disparity based on race .... Without some other justification, this express, race-
based decisionmaking violates Title VII’s command that employers cannot take adverse
employment actions because of an individual’s race.”).
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treatment and disparate impact prohibitions had long been
considered complementary tools for addressing barriers to equal
opportunity,113 the Ricci majority interpreted them for the first time
as potentially antagonistic.114 Second, the Court then concluded that
New Haven had no strong basis in evidence for doubting the tests’
validity in predicting successful job performance.115 Not only did it
reverse the lower courts’ award of summary judgment to the city, it
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs instead.116 
A. A Post-Racial Turn?
One’s view of this decision may turn in great part on one’s view
of whether the United States has yet reached post-racial status.
To those who consider the United States to have largely achieved
post-racial success, the examinations’ racial disparities trigger no
113. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (“[T]he necessary
premise of the disparate impact approach is that some employment practices, adopted without
a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to
intentional discrimination.”); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976)
(emphasizing that Title VII “prohibit[s] all practices in whatever form which create inequality
in employment opportunity due to discrimination”); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431-32 (1971) (“The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.... Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.”).
114. As Charles Sullivan frames the statutory question, “[D]oes an employer who rejects
an employment practice that disparately impacts blacks (thus jumping out of the disparate
impact pan) necessarily intentionally discriminate against whites (thus landing in the
disparate treatment fire)?” Charles A. Sullivan, Colloquy, Ricci v. DeStefano: End of the Line
or Just Another Turn on the Disparate Impact Road?, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 201, 203 (2009).
115. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673, 2676 (ruling that the city’s decision not to certify the test
results violated Title VII’s disparate treatment prohibition due to that motivation because
New Haven had no “strong basis in evidence” for believing that the test’s adverse impact on
African Americans and Latinos could not be justified as “job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)
(2006))).
116. Id. at 2681. The majority then sought to immunize the city from liability to African
American firefighters who might later challenge certification of the test results on disparate
impact grounds: 
If, after it certifies the test results, the City faces a disparate-impact suit, then
in light of our holding today it should be clear that the City would avoid
disparate-impact liability based on the strong basis in evidence that, had it not
certified the results, it would have been subject to disparate-treatment liability. 
Id. Normally, of course, an employer defending a suit that challenges its practices’ disparate
impact must establish the statutory defense that the practice is “job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
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great suspicion.117 Indeed, in a post-racial world, attending to such
disparities is itself suspicious. To those who believe that race still
plays a significant role in shaping the distribution of life opportuni-
ties in the United States, in contrast, such attention is both morally
justified by antisubordination concerns and instrumentally wise in
that it encourages the reconsideration of practices that may be poor
screens for actual ability.
Indeed, although Justice Kennedy explicitly rejected post-racial
assumptions in earlier opinions, such a rejection is difficult to
square with his opinion in Ricci. As discussed above,118 he stripped
its factual narrative not only of any discussion of the history of race
discrimination both local and national, but also of any explanation
of the adoption of disparate impact theory by the Supreme Court
and Congress in response to that history. Making no mention of the
“backdrop of entrenched inequality”119 to which disparate impact
theory responds—nor of the possibility that race continues to play
a role in the assessment of ability and thus the distribution of em-
ployment opportunities today—Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
held, for the first time, that an employer’s attention to disparate
impact against some is in fact evidence of its disparate treatment of
others.120 The majority’s premise that Title VII’s disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact provisions are potentially antagonistic
thus departs dramatically from the assumptions of the Griggs Court
and Congress that attention to employment practices’ racially
117. See Derrick Darby, Educational Inequality and the Science of Diversity in Grutter: A
Lesson for the Reparations Debate in the Age of Obama, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 755, 769-74 (2009)
(describing racial disparities’ failure to trigger suspicion of discrimination in a post-racial era).
118. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
119. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2691 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
120. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: White(ning)
Discrimination, Race-ing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at
9, on file with the author) (“Prior to Ricci the Court had never held that an employer risks
Title VII disparate treatment liability for failing to use an employment test that produces
racially adverse impact.”); Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV.
1341, 1350 (2010) (“[N]o prior decision ever conceived of disparate impact doctrine as an
exception to the prohibition on disparate treatment.”); id. at 1351 (describing how, prior to
Ricci, disparate impact remedies had not been thought “to involve any illicit motives on the
part of employers”); Michael J. Zimmer, Ricci’s Color-Blind Standard in a Race Conscious
Society: A Case of Unintended Consequences? 13-14 (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the author) (characterizing the Court as either newly defining the city’s consideration
of its practices’ racially disparate impact as impermissible animus or as newly holding that
animus is no longer required for Title VII disparate treatment purposes). 
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disparate impact remains entirely consistent with and complemen-
tary to Title VII’s objective in ensuring equal employment opportu-
nities for all.121 That the majority now finds tension between the two
unsettles the longstanding premise that attending to practices’
racially disparate impact for antisubordination purposes is not the
sort of attention to race that threatens equality values.
Indeed, one struggles to square Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ricci
with that in Parents Involved. One could envision him as writing an
opinion in Ricci that largely tracks that in Parents Involved: a
discussion of the need to attend to race so long as race continues to
play an important role in American life, followed by a conclusion
that this particular consideration of race went too far. But in Ricci
we instead see the latter without the former. Nowhere do we see any
sign of his impassioned rejection in Parents Involved of post-racial
claims that downplay the strength of ongoing antisubordination
concerns in light of discrimination’s continuing legacy.122 
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion not only created
a brand-new evidentiary rule, the strong-basis-in-evidence test, but
it then applied that rule to hold for the plaintiffs on summary
judgment—suggesting a comfort with traditional yet unexamined
measures of merit that also may be shaped by one’s assumptions
about the United States’ post-racial success, at least in the em-
ployment context.123 All agreed that the promotional examinations
at issue in Ricci imposed a significant disparate impact against
African Americans and Latinos. Considerable uncertainty remained,
however, over the tests’ accuracy in identifying the best candidates
for promotion and the possibility of less discriminatory alternatives
that better predict successful performance in leadership positions.124
In invalidating New Haven’s response to such uncertainty, the
Court simply denied its existence.125 
121. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
122. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
123. Professors Harris and West-Faulcon describe Ricci as “race-ing efforts to install fair
selection measures—that is, treating the use of job-related assessment tools that correct racial
imbalance and better measure merit as racially disparate treatment of whites.” Harris &
West-Faulcon, supra note 120, at 8.
124. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
125. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009) (“[T]here is no evidence—let alone the
required strong basis in evidence—that the tests were flawed because they were not job-
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Along these same lines, the majority simply deferred to the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement between New Haven and its
firefighters’ union, even though a public employer’s practice is never
immunized from statutory or constitutional challenge just because
a collective bargaining agreement requires it.126 In response to
testimony that the contract’s unexamined requirements that the
city administer written and oral tests and weight them on a 60/40
basis undermined the examinations’ validity,127 the majority re-
marked, “[B]ecause [the 60/40 weighting of the written and oral
tests] was the result of a union-negotiated collective-bargaining
agreement, we presume the parties negotiated that weighting for a
rational reason.”128 Yet the Court’s antidiscrimination jurisprudence
is replete with cases in which it carefully scrutinized—and not
infrequently invalidated—employers’ collective bargaining agree-
ments for statutory and, in the case of public employers, consti-
tutional violations.129 The Ricci majority itself relied on such a
related or because other, equally valid and less discriminatory tests were available to the
City.”). Even supporters of the Court’s new rule have concluded that the majority applied it
inaccurately in this case. See Marcus, supra note 23, at 75-77 (expressing support for the
strong-basis-in-evidence rule, but concluding that the Court should have remanded the case
under its new evidentiary standard because “Justice Kennedy is flatly wrong” in minimizing
New Haven’s evidence of invalidity). Professor Marcus offers a strategic hypothesis for the
Court’s summary judgment move. If the Court had remanded the case for application of the
new evidentiary standard to the facts, he predicts that the lower courts would likely have
found that New Haven in fact had the requisite strong basis in evidence for believing that the
test was invalid. Id. at 77. If that were the case, the only way for the Court to rule in favor of
the Ricci plaintiffs would be to declare Title VII’s disparate impact provision unconstitutional
—a move that Professor Marcus suggests is inevitable but that perhaps Justice Kennedy was
not yet ready to make. Id. at 77, 83.
126. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2703 n.11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“It is not at all unusual
for agreements negotiated between employers and unions to run afoul of Title VII.” (citing
Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R.R. Co., 483 F.2d 490, 497 (5th Cir. 1973))).
127. See supra notes 93, 100 and accompanying text (discussing testimony that the use of
written examinations rather than assessment centers and the 60/40 weighting—as required
by the collective bargaining agreement—raised concerns about the examinations’ ability to
predict successful job performance).
128. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2679.
129. See, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza, L.L.C. v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1463-74 (2009) (evaluating
a collective bargaining agreement’s arbitration provision for compliance with the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S.
77, 79-80, 94 (1981) (concluding that collectively bargained wage differentials violated Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979)
(evaluating a collective bargaining agreement’s affirmative action plan for compliance with
Title VII); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 328 (1977) (evaluating a
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case, borrowing its “strong-basis-in-evidence” rule130 from Wygant v.
Jackson, in which the Court struck down a public school district’s
collective bargaining agreement that required the consideration of
race when making layoff decisions.131
That the Ricci majority worked so hard to reach its result
suggests that the racial trigger for the tests’ reconsideration doomed
that action in its eyes, regardless of the legitimacy of the city’s
concerns about the tests’ validity. Again, one’s view on post-racial
status may drive what one identifies as dangerous in this context:
paying attention to race or not paying attention to race.132 Reflecting
what appear to be very different views as to the United States’ post-
racial success, the Court’s majority and dissent identified entirely
different subjects—or targets—of New Haven’s action, which in turn
shaped their very different assessments of the city’s motive. The
majority described New Haven as having decided not to promote the
plaintiffs because of their race,133 while the dissent viewed the city
as having decided not to use the tests because of concerns about
their accuracy and fairness.134 
collective bargaining agreement’s seniority provisions for compliance with Title VII). 
130. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674-75 (discussing Wygant).
131. 476 U.S. 267, 269-70, 284 (1986). 
132. Tommy Crocker described this in another context as “the way in which the Court
employs relative states of vision”—that is, what it looks closely at and what it thus sees, and
to what it remains blind. Thomas P. Crocker, Envisioning the Constitution, 57 AM. U. L. REV.
1, 40 (2007).
133. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674 (“The City rejected the test results solely because the
higher scoring candidates were white.”). As Charles Sullivan points out, the Court’s decision
potentially departs from its approach in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979), which held that purposeful discrimination for equal protection
purposes requires that the decision maker acted “because of”—and not merely “in spite
of”—the act’s adverse consequences for protected class members. See Sullivan, supra note 114,
at 206-07. Professor Sullivan suggests that we might understand New Haven as declining to
certify the test results “because of” the tests’ flaws and only “in spite of” the adverse conse-
quences for some white test-takers if the test results were not certified, just as Massachusetts
was found to be acting “because of” an employment preference’s advantages for veterans and
only “in spite of” its enormous disparate impact against women. See id. at 206-08.
134. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2710 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“It is indeed regrettable that
the City’s noncertification decision would have required all candidates to go through another
selection process. But it would have been more regrettable to rely on flawed exams to shut out
candidates who may well have the command presence and other qualities needed to excel as
fire officers.”).
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B. What’s at Stake
Prior to Ricci, a majority had never considered government’s
antisubordination ends to be troubling in and of themselves, instead
identifying certain race-based means to those ends as sufficiently
suspicious to trigger strict scrutiny. The Court now, however,
appears to treat a decision maker’s attention to the disparities
experienced by members of traditionally subordinated racial
groups—that is, its antisubordination ends—as inextricable from an
intent to discriminate against others, and thus sufficiently suspi-
cious to demand justification. Ricci may thus reflect a dramatic shift
to a new, zero-sum understanding of equality. 
Indeed, Justice Scalia concurred separately in Ricci to emphasize
the possibility that the Court had indeed signaled such a new
understanding of equality that logically extends to constitutional,
as well as statutory, antidiscrimination law: 
[I]f the Federal Government is prohibited from discriminating
on the basis of race, then surely it is also prohibited from
enacting laws mandating that third parties—e.g., employers,
whether private, State or municipal—discriminate on the basis
of race. As the facts of these cases illustrate, Title VII’s
disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb on the scales,
often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of
their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those
racial outcomes. That type of racial decisionmaking is, as the
Court explains, discriminatory.
....
... [T]he war between disparate impact and equal protection
will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin
thinking about how—and on what terms—to make peace
between them.135 
135. Id. at 2682-83 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). As Justice Scalia’s reference
to “private, State, or municipal” employers makes clear, this is not just a question of whether
Congress has the constitutional authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
apply disparate impact standards to state or local government employers. Instead, the
question is whether government’s requirement that any entity, public or private, attend to the
racial disparities of its action under a disparate impact standard is a governmental require-
ment of race-based discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
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Such a war would dramatically reshape the equal protection
landscape in several ways. Because the standards for determining
intentional discrimination are the same for both Title VII and equal
protection purposes,136 such a war could mean, for example, the
constitutional end of Title VII’s disparate impact provision as well
as other statutory prohibitions of unjustified disparate impact.137 As
Justice Scalia further observed:
To be sure, the disparate-impact laws do not mandate
imposition of quotas, but it is not clear why that should provide
a safe harbor. Would a private employer not be guilty of unlaw-
ful discrimination if he refrained from establishing a racial
hiring quota but intentionally designed his hiring practices to
achieve the same end? Surely he would. Intentional discrimina-
tion is still occurring, just one step up the chain. Government
compulsion of such design would therefore seemingly violate
equal protection principles.138
Ricci thus imperils a decision maker’s choice among facially
neutral practices, such as various selection devices used to screen
applicants for hiring or promotion, when its choice is motivated by
an interest in avoiding or ameliorating disparate impact—unless
the decision maker can establish the requisite strong basis in
136. See, e.g., Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d 774, 788 n.13 (7th Cir. 2003); Rivera v. P.R.
Aqueduct & Sewers Auth., 331 F.3d 183, 192 (1st Cir. 2003); Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 255
F.3d 615, 626 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Primus, supra note 120, at 1354 (“[T]he Ricci premise
is properly understood as a constitutional proposition as well as a statutory one. The reason
is that constitutional antidiscrimination doctrine—that is, the law of equal protection—has,
in the hands of the Supreme Court, the same substantive content as Title VII’s prohibition
on disparate treatment.”). 
137. For example, courts have interpreted the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.,
to prohibit housing practices that impose unjustified racially disparate impacts. See Langlois
v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000) (recognizing a disparate impact cause
of action under Fair Housing Act); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844
F.2d 926, 934-35 (2d Cir. 1988) (same); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 986 (4th
Cir. 1984) (same). As another example, federal agency regulations enforcing Title VI’s
statutory prohibition on race discrimination by federally funded activities include a
prohibition on activities that impose unjustified racially disparate impacts. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R.
§ 42.104(b)(2) (2009) (Department of Justice regulation interpreting Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act); 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (2009) (Department of Transportation regulation inter-
preting Title VI).
138. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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evidence for concern about a rejected practice’s validity.139 Indeed,
Ricci now gives employers pause before choosing practices that
lessen disparate impact either on their own initiative or in settle-
ment of Title VII disparate impact claims, as some wonder if they
need, and have, a strong basis in evidence before doing so.140 If
extended to the constitutional context, this view of equality would
characterize governmental attention to racial disparities when
designing its programs as sufficiently suspicious to trigger strict
scrutiny, and would treat government attention to gender dispari-
ties as sufficiently suspicious to trigger intermediate scrutiny.141 
As a number of scholars earlier observed, the rationale underly-
ing the Court’s affirmative action decisions—in which a majority
took the anticlassification view that government’s actions are
sufficiently suspicious to trigger strict scrutiny whenever it engages
in differential race-based treatment, regardless of its antisubordi-
nation motive142—also invited the argument that an institution acts
similarly suspiciously when it intentionally selects practices to
avoid or ameliorate racial disparities. For example, in 2003 Richard
Primus noted the tension between the Court’s move towards an
139. See id. at 2676 (majority opinion) (describing the strong-basis-in-evidence standard
as “appropriately constrain[ing] employers’ discretion in making race-based decisions: It limits
that discretion to cases in which there is a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact
liability, but it is not so restrictive that it allows employers to act only when there is a
provable, actual violation.”). 
140. See Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008-09 Labor and
Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 264 (2009) (Ricci “make[s] voluntary
diversity efforts less appealing to employers by casting a shadow of potential litigation over
these efforts. Will an employer going through a reduction in force (RIF), for example, be sued
by white employees if it seeks to ensure that the RIF is not unduly impacting minority
employees?”). Richard Primus thus predicts that “disparate impact doctrine is in greatest
danger of being held unconstitutional in cases where employers voluntarily seek to comply
with Title VII.” Primus, supra note 120, at 1346; see also id. at 1385 (“[I]f employers try to fix
disparate impact problems themselves, they risk creating facts on which disparate impact
doctrine might seem intolerable. After Ricci, the best chance for disparate impact doctrine to
survive is for employers to ignore it until they find themselves in court.”).
141. Under strict scrutiny, government’s race-based actions will fail equal protection
analysis unless necessary to further a compelling government interest. E.g., Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995). Government’s gender-based actions
violate equal protection unless substantially related to an important interest. E.g., United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). For a discussion of how disparate impact
provisions might survive strict scrutiny, see Primus, supra note 120, at 1382-85. 
142. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235 (holding that strict scrutiny applies to all race-based action
by the federal government); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989)
(applying strict scrutiny to all race-based action by state and local governments).
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anticlassification understanding of equal protection and statutory
disparate impact standards.143 More specifically, Professor Primus
described Title VII’s disparate impact provision as motivated by the
government’s interest in increasing the hiring and promotion of
women and people of color.144 He then characterized such motives as
potentially repugnant to an individualist, or anticlassification, view
of equal protection because they ultimately seek to change the racial
make-up of society’s winners and losers.145
Writing before Ricci, Professor Primus assessed as “entirely
remote” the chance that the statutory disparate impact standards
so long embraced by the Court and Congress would be struck down
on equal protection grounds.146 As Justice Scalia anticipates in his
concurrence, however, Ricci now makes that outcome significantly
more likely.147 
143. Primus, supra note 34, at 494.
144. Id. at 527 (“[U]nless one is prepared to purge Title VII of its responsiveness to history
and structural hierarchy, it is hard to characterize disparate impact doctrine as free of racially
allocative motives.”). 
145. Id. at 494 (“[A] statute restricting racially disparate impacts is a race-conscious
mechanism designed to reallocate opportunities from some racial groups to others.
Accordingly, the same individualist view of equal protection that has constrained the
operation of affirmative action might also raise questions about disparate impact laws.”). 
146. Id. at 501; see also id. at 495 (characterizing the issue as “analytic and conceptual
rather than predictive: it seems unlikely that disparate impact law will actually be held
unconstitutional”); id. at 585 (“The very radicalism of holding disparate impact doctrine
unconstitutional as a matter of equal protection suggests that only a very uncompromising
Court would issue such a decision.”). 
147. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2683 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). Professor
Primus more recently observed that the possibility that the Court might strike down
disparate impact provisions on equal protection grounds “was once academic speculation [but]
is now judicially actionable.” Primus, supra note 120, at 1343. But see Erwin Chemerinsky,
Moving to the Right, Perhaps Sharply to the Right, 12 GREEN BAG 2d 413, 423 (2009) (“It is
staggering to consider the implications of the Court holding that disparate-impact liability is
not allowed under civil rights statutes. But at this stage, it is hard to imagine that there
would be five votes for such a radical change in the law.”). 
To be sure, Justice Scalia anticipated the possibility that Title VII’s disparate impact
standard might still survive constitutional challenge if understood as simply a tool for
uncovering covert race-based classifications. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(discussing efforts to characterize disparate impact as “simply an evidentiary tool used to
identify genuine, intentional discrimination—to ‘smoke out,’ as it were, disparate treatment”).
He was considerably less sanguine, however, about disparate impact’s continuing viability
given its unabashedly antisubordination objectives. See id. (noting that “arguably the
disparate-impact provisions sweep too broadly to be fairly characterized in such a
fashion—since they fail to provide an affirmative defense for good-faith (i.e., nonracially
motivated) conduct, or perhaps even for good faith plus hiring standards that are entirely
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Moreover, if Ricci augurs the beginning of the constitutional end
of statutory disparate impact provisions, an even broader range of
governmental action is at risk, as the zero-sum view that attention
to racial disparities against some is evidence of intentional discrimi-
nation against others potentially imperils a wide variety of govern-
ment efforts to ameliorate continuing racial and gender hierarchies.
Examples include public schools’ efforts to increase the admission
of students of color through the use of facially race-neutral criteria
like economic disadvantage or high school class rank, such as
Texas’s “Ten Percent Plan.”148 Others include government’s recon-
sideration of sentencing provisions for crack and cocaine violations
when such reconsideration is triggered by their racially disparate
impact,149 or its choice to fund certain health initiatives to address
racial or gender disparities in access to or quality of health care.150
In short, if extended to equal protection law, a zero-sum under-
standing of equality would treat with suspicion a wide range of
government responses to its self-analysis of the racial or gender
impact of its actions.151 
reasonable”). The Supreme Court’s recent disparate-impact decision in Lewis v. City of
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010), sheds no light on this matter. In that case, a unanimous
Court interpreted Title VII’s limitations provision to permit a plaintiff to file a charge within
300 days of an employer’s use of a test that imposes disparate impact to make promotion
decisions, rather than within 300 days of the employer’s announcement that it planned to
make promotion decisions based on the test. Id. That case offered the Court no opportunity
to consider the merits, much less the constitutionality, of a disparate impact claim. 
148. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a) (Vernon 2009) (codifying Texas’s “Ten Percent
Plan,” which guarantees state university admission to the top ten percent of each Texas high
school graduating class). For examples from other states, see THE REGENTS OF THE UNIV. OF
CAL., POLICY ON UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSIONS (1988), available at http://www.university
ofcalifornia.edu/regents/policies/2102.html; Fla. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (Nov. 9, 1999),
available at http://dms.myflorida.com/media/general_counsel_files/one_florida_executive_
order_pdf. To be sure, some welcome the demise of such programs. See, e.g., Brian T.
Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action and the Texas Ten Percent
Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289 (2001) (“[T]here is something wrong, indeed, unconstitutional,
with a legislative motive to increase the percentage of one racial group in a state university
at the expense of another.”); Chapin Cimino, Comment, Class-Based Preferences in Affirmative
Action Programs After Miller v. Johnson: A Race-Neutral Option, or Subterfuge?, 64 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1289, 1306, 1308-09 (1997) (asserting that such programs may harm both beneficiaries
and nonbeneficiaries).
149. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 28-29, Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (Nos. 07-1428 and 08-328). 
150. See id. at 27.
151. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Contingent Equal Protection: Reaching for Equality After
Ricci and PICS, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 397, 408-09 (2010) (discussing Ricci’s implications
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This is not an entirely new concern, although Ricci adds to its
salience. In the immediate aftermath of the Court’s decision in
Adarand, for example, Kim Forde-Mazrui identified the constitu-
tional vulnerability of facially neutral actions consciously designed
to address racial disparities in education and elsewhere, recognizing
the growing threat posed to such programs by the Court’s increas-
ingly anticlassification bent: “If race must never occupy the
thoughts of governmental decisionmakers, then the government
cannot respond to racial problems in any fashion, not just without
reliance on racial preferences.”152 
To be sure, such a prediction of the constitutional fate of such
programs is by no means inevitable. Professor Primus, for example,
earlier suggested that even anticlassification advocates might
distinguish facially neutral means motivated by antisubordination
ends from express race-based classifications—and thus refrain
from applying strict scrutiny to the former—on the grounds that
such actions’ racial motive is not predominant.153 Andrew Carlon
similarly urged that the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence be
understood to save such programs from strict scrutiny because they
do not have immediate effects on persons classified by race.154
Moreover, even if the Court treats any such government action
with suspicion, such measures may still survive strict scrutiny, as
Kim Forde-Mazrui and Jennifer Hendricks have argued.155 What
Ricci’s redefinition of culpable mental state for antidiscrimination
for government’s efforts to address long-standing racial and gender hierarchies); Marcus,
supra note 23, at 71 (“After Ricci, one can draw a parallel lesson from Kennedy’s Parents
Involved concurrence: Facially neutral educational decisions will trigger strict scrutiny when
they are motivated by a predominantly race-conscious intent. That link between the two
opinions has broad implications.”).
152. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 104, at 2348 (“Taken to its logical end, the Equal Protection
Clause requires government to ignore the stark racial disparities that persist in our society.
The government cannot, in response ... seek to address the conditions that undermine their
education, such as poor quality schools, poverty, or family breakdown, even if disadvantaged
children of all races, including white, are benefited.”); see also id. at 2332; Kimberly Jenkins
Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts To Achieve Diversity and Avoid
Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277, 282-83 (2009)
(describing constitutional vulnerability of race-neutral efforts intended to increase racial
diversity).
153. See Primus, supra note 34, at 549. 
154. Andrew M. Carlon, Racial Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1151, 1153-60. 
155. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 104, at 2336-37 (marshaling arguments that such
measures are narrowly tailored to achieve compelling government interests); Hendricks,
supra note 151, at 414 (same).
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purposes destabilizes, however, is the long-standing assumption
that the Court does not view government’s attention to race to
achieve antisubordination ends as itself suspicious.
IV. EXPLORING OTHER PATHS
Part III examined the possibility that the Court has now signaled
a post-racial turn towards a new, zero-sum understanding of
equality that logically extends to constitutional, as well as statutory,
antidiscrimination law. To be sure, however, this is not the only way
to understand the Court’s move.156 This Part considers alternative
directions in which the Court might turn.
A. Maybe the Court Hasn’t Turned Very Hard
Prior to Ricci, a Court majority had never considered govern-
ment’s antisubordination ends to be troubling in and of themselves,
instead identifying certain race-based means to those ends as
sufficiently suspicious to trigger strict scrutiny. Although Part III.B
considered the possibility that the majority now considers all
attention to race—regardless of its antisubordination ends—as
suspicious, this Part examines the possibility that the majority
simply viewed the city as engaging in the sort of race-based
156. For other explorations of Ricci’s possible implications for equality law generally, see
Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 120, at 10 (describing Ricci as a move towards “whitening
discrimination—that is reframing antidiscrimination law’s presumptions and burdens to focus
on disparate treatment of whites as the paradigmatic and ultimately preferred claim”);
Marcus, supra note 23, at 55 (arguing that Ricci correctly suggests “that equal protection is
consistent with disparate impact only when the latter provision is narrowly construed”);
Primus, supra note 120, at 1346, 1382-85 (exploring alternative understandings of Ricci and
its implications, and concluding that the Supreme Court’s ultimate choice among the available
alternatives “may be substantially driven by the way the next case to reach the Court frames
the question”). For discussions of Ricci’s implications for Title VII more specifically, see
Joseph Seiner & Benjamin Gutman, The New Disparate Impact, 90 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2010) (manuscript at 4, on file with author) (arguing that Ricci creates a new affirmative
defense for employers facing disparate impact claims); Kerri Lynn Stone, Ricci Glitch? The
Unexpected Appearance of Transferred Intent in Title VII, 55 LOY. L. REV. 752, 752 (2010)
(describing the Ricci Court as endorsing a new “transferred intent” claim under Title VII);
Sullivan, supra note 114, at 211 (predicting that Ricci’s implications will be limited to
relatively narrow fact patterns); Zimmer, supra note 120, at 5 (describing the Court as newly
expanding the definition of disparate treatment for Title VII purposes in ways that might be
“used to advance the general antidiscrimination agenda”).
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means—that is, differential treatment based on race—that it had
long considered suspicious. 
In other words, the Court may view actions motivated by
antisubordination ends with suspicion only when those actions
make identifiable third parties worse off in tangible ways, because
at that point, and not until that point, it sees the costs of attending
to race for antisubordination ends as outweighing its benefits.157
Charles Sullivan, for example, explains the majority’s move in Ricci
as reflecting its concern for an employer’s very late-stage changes
that frustrated identifiable plaintiffs’ significant reliance interests.
He thus suggests that Ricci might prove a fact-specific anomaly,
with little significance for antidiscrimination law outside of “the
end-stages of any selection process.”158 Along similar lines, Richard
Primus characterizes this as the “visible-victims reading” of Ricci,
in which the decision turns on “the fact that the decision disadvan-
taged determinate and visible innocent third parties.”159 Under this
view, antidiscrimination law “may well distinguish between those
[race-conscious actions] that have visible victims and those whose
costs are more diffuse.”160 
157. Indeed, the Ricci majority emphasized what it saw as tangible costs incurred by the
test-takers. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009) (“The injury arises in part
from the high, and justified, expectations of the candidates .... Many of [whom] had studied
for months, at considerable personal and financial expense, and thus the injury caused by the
City’s reliance on raw racial statistics at the end of the process was all the more severe.”); see
also id. at 2676 (“Examinations like those administered by the City create legitimate
expectations on the part of those who took the tests. As is the case with any promotion exam,
some of the firefighters here invested substantial time, money, and personal commitment in
preparing for the tests.”). 
158. Sullivan, supra note 114, at 208; see also id. (“The majority in Ricci repeatedly referred
to the white firefighters’ expectations of, and reliance on, the use of the test as a promotion
method, neither of which would exist if the employer’s disparate impact calculations occurred
early in the process.”).
159. Primus, supra note 120, at 1345.
160. Id. In addition to identifying as possibilities that Ricci might be broadly understood
as the end of disparate impact doctrine or instead more narrowly as treating with suspicion
only those race-conscious actions that harm “visible victims,” Professor Primus posits a third
“institutional” reading, in which “courts may order race-conscious remedies for disparate
impact problems, but public employers may not.” Id. at 1364. Under this view, changing racial
and political dynamics in many American cities mean that “under current conditions, a
municipal employer like New Haven might have incentives to engage in race-conscious
decisionmaking beyond that which a court would order to remedy authentic disparate impact
violations.” Id. at 1369; see also id. (“Within that framework, it makes sense for equal
protection to be less tolerant of a public employer’s race-conscious actions taken to comply
with Title VII than of a court’s race-conscious actions taken to enforce the same statute.”).
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Under this reading, employers may still attend to potential racial
disparities when choosing among various available employment
practices before the reliance interests of identifiable victims cohere.
For example, under this approach New Haven could choose to rely
on assessment centers rather than written tests without violating
antidiscrimination law even though motivated by an interest in
ameliorating racially disparate impact—so long as it did so before it
fueled candidates’ expectations of a written test. Employers would
remain free under this view to avoid a number of New Haven’s
mistakes at the design stage, which include the city’s failure to
consider the possibility of risk assessment centers instead of other
selection devices, its unexamined adherence to the 60/40 weighting
of the written and oral examinations, and its failure to find some
opportunity for the exams’ review by those familiar with firefighting
practices specific to New Haven.161 
Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s opinion indicates the possibility of a
limiting principle along these lines: 
Nor do we question an employer’s affirmative efforts to ensure
that all groups have a fair opportunity to apply for promotions
and to participate in the process by which promotions will be
made. But once that process has been established and employers
have made clear their selection criteria, they may not then
invalidate the test results, thus upsetting an employee’s
legitimate expectation not to be judged on the basis of race....
Title VII does not prohibit an employer from considering,
before administering a test or practice, how to design that test
or practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for all individu-
Although this reading may or may not accurately describe the majority’s underlying concerns,
its empirical premise has yet to be proven. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2690 n.1 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“Never mind the flawed tests New Haven used and the better selection methods
used elsewhere, Justice Alito’s concurring opinion urges. Overriding all else, racial politics,
fired up by a strident African American pastor, were at work in New Haven. Even a detached
and disinterested observer, however, would have every reason to ask: Why did such racially
skewed results occur in New Haven, when better tests likely would have produced less
disproportionate results?”) (citation omitted). As discussed infra notes 233-39 and
accompanying text, I also resist this reading as a normative matter because Title VII’s
disparate impact provision has been so key in forcing reexamination of and improvements to
public sector employment practices. 
161. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2710 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This case presents an
unfortunate situation, one New Haven might well have avoided had it utilized a better
selection process in the first place.”).
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als regardless of their race. And when, during the test-design
stage, an employer invites comments to ensure the test is fair,
that process can provide a common ground for open discussions
toward that end.162
If Ricci in fact “applies only to actions taken at the back-end of a
selection process when employer or applicant expectations have
crystallized and reliance on the process has begun,”163 then how
such a rule would work in practice remains unclear.164 For example,
would it freeze an employer’s choices “once that process has been
established and employers have made clear their selection cri-
teria,”165 even though the disparate impact of such choices may not
become apparent until the practices have passed the design stage
into implementation? How would an institution acquire a “strong
basis in evidence” for determining whether its possible options
would generate an unjustified disparate impact at those early pre-
implementation stages?166 
162. Id. at 2677 (majority opinion). Note, however, that Justice Kennedy speaks only to the
opportunity for all “to apply,” “to participate,” and to respond to an employer’s invitation for
comments on test design. That is not the same as considering or measuring racial disparities
and acting in response to them, as Justice Scalia recognized in his concurrence. See id. at 2682
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“Would a private employer not be guilty of unlawful discrimination
if he refrained from establishing a racial hiring quota but intentionally designed his hiring
practices to achieve the same end? Surely he would. Intentional discrimination is still
occurring, just one step up the chain.”).
163. See Sullivan, supra note 114, at 211.
164. The majority’s articulation of its new rule invites considerable uncertainty about how
broadly or narrowly it should be understood, depending on how broadly or narrowly one
frames the city’s action: “We conclude that race-based action like the City’s in this case is
impermissible under Title VII unless the employer can demonstrate a strong-basis-in-evidence
that, had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact
statute.” Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664; see also id. at 2676 (describing the strong-basis-in-evidence
standard as “appropriately constrain[ing] employers’ discretion in making race-based
decisions: it limits that discretion to cases in which there is a strong basis in evidence of
disparate-impact liability, but it is not so restrictive that it allows employers to act only when
there is a provable, actual violation.”). 
165. Id. at 2677.
166. See John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Antidiscrimination
Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM
L. REV. 423, 507 (2002) (“[I]t is impossible to know in advance whether one’s actions will in
fact perpetuate or add to the societal subordination of any minority group.”). To be sure,
though, some practices’ disparate impact and suspect validity may be immediately
apparent—such as height and weight requirements that create an obvious disparate impact
against women or residency requirements in areas that have few minority residents.
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Consider, for example, a range of decisions to abandon a selection
device at different stages in the process once its disparate impact
has become apparent: for example, the decision to extend an appli-
cation deadline in light of concerns that the applicant pool gener-
ated only by word-of-mouth recruiting had a racially disparate
impact, or the decision to interview additional candidates in light of
concerns about racial disparities in a finalist pool generated after
subjective interviews. At what point in the process, if any, can the
employer modify its process due to concerns about racial disparities?
At what point have the applicants who complied with the original
rules established sufficiently strong reliance interests such that a
decision to change the rules imposes unacceptably great costs to
them, and thus violates antidiscrimination law?167 If the Court’s
turn is in fact limited to the rare situation involving an employer’s
very late-stage changes in its practices that frustrate the already-
established reliance interests of—and thus pose unacceptably great
burdens to—nonbeneficiaries, then the next step is to develop
further guidance on an employer’s ability to measure and respond
to racial disparities in these various contexts. 
B. Maybe the Court Hasn’t Yet Decided Whether (And in What
Direction) It’s Turning
The yet-unanswered questions posed above suggest another
alternative: that the Court has yet to determine the direction of any
change in its understanding of equality. Prior to Ricci, a majority
had never considered government’s antisubordination ends to be
troubling in and of themselves. Instead, the Court identified certain
race-based means to those ends as sufficiently suspicious to demand
justification.168 Ricci forced the Court to confront the question of
when attention to race for antisubordination ends is suspicious, and
when it is not, in the context of means that are difficult to character-
ize with confidence as facially race-based or race-neutral. On one
hand, New Haven did not apply different rules to different employ-
167. In light of these practical challenges, Professor Sullivan suggests that Ricci must
simply be inapplicable to such early stage decisions, especially outside of the testing context.
See Sullivan, supra note 114, at 211.
168. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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ees based on race.169 On the other hand, New Haven did consider
racially disparate impact in choosing which rule to apply—with
racially predictable effects.170
New Haven’s action thus poses a challenge for those seeking to
locate it on the Court’s long-standing equal protection map of gov-
ernment’s permissible and impermissible means for attending to
race.171 This map reveals that the Court’s comfort with—or suspicion
of—race-conscious actions sometimes turns on the government’s
underlying ends and sometimes on the degree to which the individ-
ual effects of its racially motivated means can be characterized as
concrete or diffuse. The complexity of the Ricci facts, in short, makes
it difficult to determine whether the majority viewed the fundamen-
tal threat to equality as the city’s chosen ends, its means, or some
combination of the two. A key unanswered question thus turns on
whether the Court is rethinking the universe of race-conscious
motivations or race-conscious means, or both, that it considers
suspicious for antidiscrimination law purposes. 
In one corner of the map, first consider those actions in which
“the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of
individual racial classifications”172—that is, when it treats individu-
als differently because of race.173 Andrew Carlon helpfully describes
these actions as “classifications with effects”—that is, “individual
racial classifications with immediate effect on the persons classi-
fied.”174 The Court treats such means as sufficiently suspicious to
169. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
171. For a related taxonomy of “racially-attentive” actions, see Harris & West-Faulcon,
supra note 120, at 22-23 (describing how policymakers’ “racial attentiveness” may accompany
“race-positive,” “race-neutral,” or “race-negative” results).
172. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 719, 720 (2007)
(plurality opinion). Andrew Carlon also describes this as “racial adjudication”—that is, the
product of “a particularized proceeding that seeks to identify, as one of its determinative
elements, the race of the person whose rights or liabilities are being adjudicated” and that has
“immediate effect on the persons classified.” Carlon, supra note 154, at 1159, 1199. As Richard
Primus explains, this also describes “disparate treatment” for Title VII purposes—that is,
when “employers apply[ ] different rules to employees of different races.” Primus, supra note
120, at 1350. 
173. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (“[The Equal Protection Clause] simply
keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant
respects alike.”).
174. Carlon, supra note 154, at 1199. Professor Carlon describes the commonly used
equal protection vocabulary of “classifications” as “unfortunate ... because it is not really
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trigger strict scrutiny, regardless of the government’s benign or
malign ends.175 As described above,176 however, a majority long
distinguished between those motives when determining whether
they are sufficiently compelling to overcome such suspicion for
purposes of equal protection analysis.177
Second, government’s facially neutral means that are motivated
by its intent to perpetuate racial hierarchy—that is, government’s
subterfuge in concealing what are really efforts to engage in race-
based classifications—violate equal protection.178 Examples include
school districts’ facially neutral closure of public schools to students
of all races in an effort to prevent desegregation.179 
‘classification’ generally that is under review, but a sort of classification with effect.” Id. at
1157 (emphasis added). As he points out, courts have not considered “classifications without
... effect,” such as tracking racial demographics for census purposes, as suspicious. Id. at 1158-
59 (emphasis added). 
175. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (citing Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978)). Whether such actions survive such scrutiny
often depends on how much or how rigidly race is considered at the decision-making stage.
Compare Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-72, 275-76 (2003) (invalidating public
university’s automatic and predetermined race-based “bonus” in admissions decisions), with
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334-35, 343-44 (2003) (upholding public law school’s more
flexible consideration of race as a plus-factor in admissions decisions).
176. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
177. Many of these cases thus focus on contested characterizations of the government’s
motive—that is, whether it actually sought to remedy continuing discrimination or instead
to achieve some other, presumably less compelling, objective. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson, 476
U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (plurality opinion) (discussing competing characterizations of the
motive actually underlying government’s race-based classification as either seeking to achieve
an antisubordination interest in remedying past discrimination or instead an interest in
ensuring a racially diverse pool of role models for students).
178. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Ass’n, 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). Richard Primus notes that Title VII’s
disparate treatment prohibition has been similarly understood to 
cover[ ] cases of illicit employer motive, whether or not those motives lead to
disparities in the treatment of individuals of different races.
.... 
We simply understand that “disparate treatment” in Title VII is a term that
covers both formal differences in the treatment of people of different groups and
unlawful employer motives. 
Primus, supra note 120, at 1350, 1351 n.56 (emphasis added).  
179. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439-40 (1968); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd.,
377 U.S. 218, 233-34 (1964). The Court’s decision in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226-
27 (1971)—in which it rejected an equal protection challenge to a city’s facially neutral closure
of all city swimming pools rather than desegregate them—seems hard to square with this
rule. Apparently recognizing that tension, the Court in later cases characterized the city’s
action in Palmer not only as facially neutral but also as motivated by a sincere interest “to
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A third category involves the flip side of the second: government’s
facially neutral actions that are motivated by its intent to under-
mine racial hierarchy.180 Examples include statutory disparate
impact provisions, admissions programs like the Texas “Ten Percent
Plan” that seek to increase racial diversity by basing admissions on
class rank in all schools, and school siting decisions that draw
neighborhood attendance zones with an eye to racial demographics.
Here, government considers the racial impact of various rules or
standards when choosing among available options—but those
standards, once selected, then apply to all regardless of race. The
Court has not considered these as covert efforts to engage in race-
based classifications, and thus has not treated them with suspicion,
at least not prior to Ricci.181
More difficult to map is a fourth set of race-conscious governmen-
tal actions motivated by antisubordination ends that may or may
not be characterized as the sort of race-based means—that is,
differential treatment based on race—that clearly trigger the
Court’s suspicion, and thus strict scrutiny. Examples include the
decision to target limited resources towards the recruitment of
students or workers of color to generate a more racially diverse
preserve peace and avoid deficits” rather than by a desire to perpetuate racial hierarchy. See
Davis, 426 U.S. at 243. Along these lines, the Court later significantly narrowed the meaning
of “intent” for equal protection purposes to require that the decision maker acted “because
of”—and not merely “in spite of”—the act’s adverse consequences for protected class members.
Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (rejecting equal protection challenge to state
veterans’ preference program on grounds that state legislature enacted the program “in spite
of” and not “because of” its effect in excluding women from most state jobs); see also
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287, 291-92 (1987) (rejecting equal protection challenge to
state’s administration of death penalty in which defendants charged with killing whites were
4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence than defendants charged with killing African
Americans). Decades after announcing a narrow understanding of government’s purposeful
discrimination against traditionally subordinated groups, Ricci suggests the Court’s newly
expanded willingness to find that the government has purposefully discriminated when it
seeks to ameliorate disparities experienced by those same groups.
180. Andrew Carlon describes such actions as “race-conscious policymaking”—that is, “the
prospective design of generally applicable policies not directed at identifiable individuals,
which takes into account the aggregate racial makeup of those predicted to be affected by
these policies.” Carlon, supra note 154, at 1160 (emphasis added). Kim Forde-Mazrui earlier
described such practices as “alternative action.” Forde-Mazrui, supra note 104, at 2332.
Richard Primus then characterized such “alternative action” as “an Arlington Heights law in
reverse. It is, by hypothesis, a law motivated by the desire to allocate something to one or
more racial groups at the inevitable expense of others.” Primus, supra note 34, at 541. 
181. See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
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applicant pool. Although the decision to recruit some and not others
based on race is arguably a difference in treatment that affects the
size of the applicant pool and thus individuals’ chances of securing
scarce slots, that decision does not consider race in allocating the
ultimate employment or educational opportunity itself. 
Before Ricci, courts generally182 have not viewed government’s
attention to race, that is, its antisubordination ends, with suspicion
if its chosen means fall in either of the last two categories—
apparently because those means impose comparatively diffuse
effects on nonbeneficiaries such that the costs incurred by third
parties remain outweighed by the benefits of achieving antisub-
ordination ends.183 Recall, for example, Justice Kennedy’s vigorous
defense of measures in both those categories in Parents Involved,
where he emphasized the importance of preserving “strategic site
selection of new schools,” “drawing attendance zones with general
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods,” and “recruiting
students and faculty in a targeted fashion.”184 Justice Kennedy
noted that the moral and instrumental concerns of anticlassification
advocates like himself are not only attenuated in the context of such
race-conscious measures because they do not treat individuals “in
different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual
typing by race,”185 but are also ultimately outweighed by the moral
and instrumental benefits of attending to antisubordination con-
cerns in a society that has not yet achieved post-racial status.186 For
these reasons, prior to Ricci, the Court had treated government’s
182. But not always. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, applied strict scrutiny
to, and struck down, the Federal Communications Commission’s race-targeted recruiting
requirement. See MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass’n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13, 20-21 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(“[T]he Commission has compelled broadcasters to redirect their necessarily finite recruiting
resources so as to generate a larger percentage of applications from minority candidates. As
a result, some prospective nonminority applicants who would have learned of job
opportunities but for the Commission’s directive now will be deprived of an opportunity to
compete simply because of their race.”).
183. See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text; see also Carlon, supra note 154, at
1199 (“[R]ace-conscious policymaking is entirely appropriate, as long as it is driven by anti-
subordination values.”). 
184. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] constitutional violation does not
occur whenever a decisionmaker considers the impact a given approach might have on
students of different races.”). 
185. See id. at 788-89.
186. Id. at 788-90.
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attention to race to achieve antisubordination ends as suspicious
only when such race-consciousness animated differential treatment
based on race, that is, “classifications with effects,” but not when
such motives animated something else, that is, facially neutral
treatment or measures like targeted recruitment that are difficult
to characterize.187 
But Justice Kennedy did not view the city’s action in Ricci as the
sort of permissible means to the end of destabilizing long-standing
racial disparities that he defended in Parents Involved. As explored
in Part IV.A, his opinions in these two cases might be harmonized
as permitting an actor to attend to race for antisubordination
purposes at the planning stage, but not after it begins to make
decisions that impair the specific expectations of, and thus impose
unacceptably tangible costs to, racially identifiable individuals.188 In
other words, he may have considered the city’s action as constituting
the sort of “classification with effects” that triggers suspicion under
the Court’s pre-Ricci precedents.189 Indeed, the Ricci majority
signaled such an understanding when it characterized the city’s
action as “express, race-based decisionmaking”190 and “the sort of
racial preference that Congress has disclaimed”191—apparently
because it found the “losers” in this case to be readily identifiable on
racial grounds, an outcome offensive to anticlassification advocates. 
The Ricci facts, however, are not so easily located on the Court’s
long-standing equal protection map. Indeed, the decision turns in
great part on the choice to frame the target of New Haven’s action
as the white test-takers or instead the potentially flawed tests192—a
choice complicated by the fact that New Haven’s concerns about
fairness and accuracy were triggered by its attention to the tests’
racial disparities, as Title VII’s disparate impact provision requires.
187. See id. at 797 (describing “race-conscious measures that do not rely on differential
treatment based on individual classifications” as insufficiently suspicious to trigger strict
scrutiny); see also Carlon, supra note 154, at 1153 (characterizing Justice Kennedy in Parents
Involved as having “seen where the logic of ‘reactionary colorblindness’ is ultimately taking
us. He needs a stopping point—and so do we.”). 
188. See supra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
189. Kenneth Marcus suggests that Justice Kennedy’s opinions can be reconciled as
reflecting the view that facially neutral actions should trigger courts’ suspicion when race is
the “predominant” motivation. Marcus, supra note 23, at 72. 
190. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009). 
191. Id. at 2677. 
192. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
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In other words, New Haven’s action might be understood as
motivated by a desire for a certain racial mix or instead by a desire
for a fairer and more accurate promotional process.193 In choosing
between these frames, recall that an anticlassification interpreta-
tion of equality law forbids actors from “[r]educ[ing] an individual
to an assigned racial identity for differential treatment.”194 But
different from what or whom? To be sure, Mr. Ricci probably was
treated differently than he would have been absent the existence of
Title VII’s disparate impact standard, which requires that employ-
ers consider their practices’ impact on employees of different races.
Without such a provision, New Haven would likely never have
assessed its tests’ disparate impact and potential invalidity and
thus reconsidered their use. But Mr. Ricci was not treated differ-
ently than any other firefighter based on race, and in fact was not
treated differently than any other firefighter at all: the test results
were discarded for all, regardless of race, and no one was promoted,
regardless of race.195 
For this reason, New Haven’s response to its practices’ disparate
impact is not an example of affirmative action programs that are
more easily mapped as falling within the first category of “classifica-
tions with effects” described above196 and thus generally among the
institutional actions quickest to trigger objections by post-racial and
193. Neither the parties nor the Court apparently considered the possibility that both were
at work. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 89 (2d Cir. 2008) (Calabresi, J., concurring in the
denial of rehearing en banc) (explaining that the plaintiffs had not raised a mixed-motives
claim). Instead, the fight centered on how to frame what all appeared to agree was a single
motive. As Michael Zimmer points out, “[T]he facts here would also just as readily support a
finding that the City acted ‘solely’ because the scores of minority test-takers taken as groups
were too low when compared with the scores of white test-takers.” See Zimmer, supra note
120, at 12. That the majority sees the two as inextricable further indicates its new zero-sum
understanding of discrimination.
194. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. at 701, 795
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. See Banks, supra note 3, at 55 (“[T]here is no doubt that the case raises the question
of the permissibility of race-neutral measures undertaken for a race related purpose.”);
Marcus, supra note 23, at 70 (“The key fact in Ricci is that disparate-treatment analysis was
triggered by an employment decision that arguably had race-conscious intent and effects, even
though it treated employees of all races in an identical manner—by discarding their test
scores.”); Primus, supra note 34, at 563 (“Nothing in disparate impact doctrine calls for
individual employees or applicants to be treated differently from one another on racial
grounds at the moment an employment decision is made.”).
196. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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other anticlassification adherents.197 Although both categories are
motivated by antisubordination objectives, they use different means
to further those ends. New Haven’s decision applied to all—
disappointing high scorers and offering another opportunity to low
scorers—regardless of race or national origin.
The most vigorously contested affirmative action measures, in
contrast, involve race-based classifications that an employer seeks
to justify as falling within an exception to Title VII’s disparate
treatment provision198 or, in the equal protection context, that a gov-
ernment actor seeks to defend as satisfying strict scrutiny.199 As an
illustration, consider the program at issue in the Court’s 1986 equal
protection decision in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.200
There the Court upheld a constitutional challenge to the enforce-
ment of a public school district’s collective bargaining agreement
that provided African American teachers with preferential protec-
tion from layoffs.201 Emphasizing teachers’ heavy reliance interests
in retaining their existing jobs, the Wygant plurality found that the
agreement’s provision unsettled the white teachers’ entrenched
expectations and thus was not narrowly tailored as required to
survive equal protection analysis even if motivated by the govern-
ment’s compelling interest in remedying past discrimination.202
Key differences distinguish the Wygant facts from those in Ricci.
Perhaps most important, Wygant involved a concededly race-based
classification, thus falling in the first category of “classifications
197. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2700 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing the plaintiffs’ claim in Ricci from a challenge to an affirmative action plan).
198. The Court has interpreted Title VII to permit employers to consider protected class
status as part of an affirmative action plan so long as the plan’s purpose mirrors that of Title
VII and does not unnecessarily trammel the rights of nonbeneficiaries. See Johnson v. Transp.
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 619-20 (1987) (upholding county’s consideration of sex or race as a plus-
factor in promotions to remedy substantial underrepresentation of women and people of color
in traditionally segregated jobs); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197
(1979) (upholding collective bargaining agreement’s dedication of a certain percentage of
openings in training programs to African American workers to break down long-standing
patterns of racial hierarchy within those jobs). 
199. The Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to permit government actors
to consider race as part of an affirmative action plan so long as the plan is narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling government interest. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333
(2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
200. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
201. Id. at 269-70, 284.
202. Id. at 283.  
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with effect” described above: individual employees were identified
as winners and losers (those who were laid off and those who were
not) based in part on race.203 In Ricci, in contrast, no individual
employees “won”—no promotions were made, regardless of race.
Similarly, no individual employees “lost” in Ricci, at least in the
Wygant sense, as New Haven’s high-scoring test-takers were eligible
for—but not entitled to—promotion even under the city’s original
plan.204 
Moreover, the Wygant plurality suggested a spectrum of race-
based treatment characterized as more or less troubling based on
the diffuseness of the burdens experienced by nonbeneficiaries,
with layoffs resulting in job loss closer to one end and disappointed
hiring expectations closer to the other. The plurality indicated that
government’s race-based decisions are more likely to fail narrow
tailoring analysis when they impose particularly tangible or con-
crete costs—that is, when they change the status quo: “While hiring
goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several
opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial
equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious dis-
ruption of their lives. That burden is too intrusive.”205 The Ricci
majority’s heavy weighting of the reliance interests impaired by
disappointed promotion expectations, in contrast, casts doubt on
whether the current Court still embraces the Wygant spectrum, or
203. See id. at 270-72.
204. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2690 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The white
firefighters who scored high on New Haven’s promotional exams understandably attract this
Court’s sympathy. But they had no vested right to promotion. Nor have other persons received
promotions in preference to them.”); see also Brief of the States of Maryland, Alaska,
Arkansas, Iowa, Nevada, and Utah as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3-4, Ricci, 129
S. Ct. 2658 (Nos. 07-1428 and 08-328) (arguing that the Ricci plaintiffs’ allegations of future
adverse action are not justiciable on standing and ripeness grounds and that an employer’s
decision to defer final action is not an adverse employment action for Title VII purposes);
Primus, supra note 120, at 1357 (“Ricci never acknowledges that as a matter of disparate
treatment doctrine, the plaintiffs’ claim of statutorily cognizable injury might be premature.
The Court’s apparent indifference on this score is the first suggestion that its analysis did not
hew to the distinctive concerns of disparate treatment law.”); Zimmer, supra note 120, at 25
(“What [the plaintiffs] lost was a promotional opportunity which, presumably, would be
replaced with a different procedure that would likely give them another opportunity to be
promoted. In other words, it may be that all they suffered was a delayed promotion.”). 
205. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-83 (“Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as
intrusive as loss of an existing job.”); id. at 283 (“Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations
in a way that general hiring goals do not.”). 
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whether it has instead expanded its understanding of the costs to
nonbeneficiaries that are sufficiently weighty to trump the benefits
of achieving antisubordination ends. 
A related question turns on whether the majority views race-
conscious means that impose effects on third parties’ employment
opportunities as more concrete and thus suspicious than those that
impose effects on voting and certain educational opportunities.206
For example, unlike the Wygant plurality, the current majority may
see employment opportunities as inherently zero-sum, as the hiring
or promotion of one applicant often forecloses that of another. Along
these lines, some evidence suggests that Justice Kennedy’s comfort
with race-conscious means to antisubordination ends may not apply
to the employment setting—perhaps because he is quicker to see
post-racial progress in that context and thus less likely to credit the
continuing strength of antisubordination interests there.207 Or
perhaps Justice Kennedy has not yet decided in which direction his
understanding of equality—and that of the Court as well208—will
turn.209 The possibilities thus remain that the Court has either
redrawn its equal protection map or that it has not yet determined
whether and how it might do so. 
206. See Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121
HARV. L. REV. 104, 105 (2007) (suggesting that Justice Kennedy’s views on race may be tied
to certain voting and educational contexts “and less generalizable across cases”); id. at 116
(“[E]ven a judge committed to the colorblind ideal might worry, as Kennedy seems to, that the
value of colorblindness cannot be learned in a racially segregated school.”) (emphasis added). 
207. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 791 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing concern that the dissent’s
application of antisubordination theory would apply “in areas far afield from schooling”); see
also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 395 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“It is regrettable
the Court’s important holding allowing racial minorities to have their special circumstances
considered in order to improve their educational opportunities is accompanied by a suspension
of the strict scrutiny which was the predicate of allowing race to be considered in the first
place.... The Constitution cannot confer the right to classify on the basis of race even in this
special context absent searching judicial review. For these reasons, though I reiterate my
approval of giving appropriate consideration to race in this one context, I must dissent in the
present case.”) (emphasis added).
208. See Ilya Shapiro, A Faint-Hearted Libertarian at Best: The Sweet Mystery of Justice
Anthony Kennedy, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 348 (2009) (book review) (“[I]t is safe to say
that, for the foreseeable future, the outcome of race cases will all depend upon Justice
Kennedy.”); see also id. at 333 (describing Justice Kennedy as “the Court’s one and only swing
Justice” after Justice O’Connor’s retirement).
209. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (predicting that the majority’s
opinion “will not have staying power”).
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V. AVOIDING A COLLISION BETWEEN ANTIDISCRIMINATION VALUES
BY CHALLENGING A ZERO-SUM UNDERSTANDING OF EQUALITY 
This last possibility invites efforts to shape the direction of the
Court’s understanding of equality by revisiting the social meaning
of decision makers’ attention to racial or gender impact when
choosing among available policy options that will then apply to all,
regardless of protected class status. Deborah Hellman, for example,
urges that we understand government action as offending equality
principles “if its meaning conflicts with the government’s obligation
to treat each person with equal concern.”210 This approach under-
stands antidiscrimination values as rooted primarily in the meaning
onlookers derive from the contested action—in particular, whether
they understand the government to be acting in a way that demeans
some person or persons. As Richard Primus similarly observed,
Symbolism and social meaning have always shaped the law of
equal protection, and necessarily so.... The canonical failure of
equal protection analysis, after all, was Plessy v. Ferguson’s
refusal to understand that a formally neutral action might carry
a clear meaning about racial hierarchy. 
... The social meaning of disparate impact doctrine accord-
ingly figures in the assessment of its constitutionality, and social
meaning is in part a function of what is visible to a public
audience.211
What is visible to a public audience—and thus what shapes social
meaning—often turns on the narratives we emphasize. Indeed, as
Professor Hellman observes, “[H]ow else can we come to understand
the meaning of actions than by talking and listening to each other?
Debates about the meaning of laws and policies, both inside and
outside the courtroom, are important parts of this endeavor.”212 Part
II of this Article, for example, focused on the competing narratives
offered by the various opinions in Ricci, where the majority found,
210. Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV.
1, 2 (2000).
211. Primus, supra note 120, at 1347.
212. See Hellman, supra note 210, at 69.
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and made, particularly visible the expectations of hard-working
white test-takers who played by the announced rules.213 
Consider, then, the possibility of a counter-narrative that explores
the win-win possibilities214 created by disparate impact provisions
in expanding opportunities for those—regardless of protected class
status—who are overlooked by measures that do not accurately
assess ability. In other words, although the Ricci majority character-
ized disparate treatment and disparate impact as antidiscrim-
ination values in collision,215 they need not be so understood if one
recognizes that they share a commitment to identifying and re-
warding individual merit as well as achieving antisubordination
goals. By revisiting the role that disparate impact doctrine and
similar measures play in ensuring that candidates are selected on
actual merit rather than on unexamined yet entrenched assump-
tions that replicate patterns of subordination, this Part offers a case
study for reshaping an impoverished zero-sum understanding of
such efforts.216
213. See powell, supra note 3, at 792-93 (“There is an assumption that racially targeted
programs create white resentment because there is a sense that whites who are playing by
the rules are having things taken from them and given to undeserving non-whites who do not
play by the same rules. This resentment is, apparently, not of the Jim Crow form. These
whites are willing to accept any non-white that plays by the rules. What they object to is
helping those they perceive as rulebreakers.”). As another example of how social meaning may
turn on such narrative choices, consider the following June 2009 CNN poll question that
makes no mention of the dispute over the tests’ ability to predict successful job performance: 
In a case currently before the Supreme Court, a city decided to use a test to
determine which firefighters should receive promotions. No black firefighters
scored high enough on the test to earn a promotion, so the city decided not to
offer promotions to the white firefighters who got the highest scores on the test.
Which of the following statements comes closest to your view? Those white
firefighters were victims of discrimination and should get the promotions based
on the test results [or] [b]ecause no black firefighters got high scores, the city
should use a new test to make sure that blacks were not victims of discrim-
ination.
CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll (June 26-28, 2009), available at http://www.
pollingreport.com/race.htm. Sixty-five percent of respondents chose the first statement; 31
percent the latter; 4 percent were unsure. Id. 
214. Negotiation theory, for example, often emphasizes a focus on identifying parties’
shared interests in hopes of maximizing gains for all, as opposed to position-based approaches
that think purely in “win-lose” terms. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO
YES 13 (1991); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 11-14 (1987).
215. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
216. Although this Part focuses on disparate impact standards, one could similarly revisit
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To be sure, these arguments are unlikely to persuade those who
adhere to anticlassification theory for moral and/or instrumental
reasons entirely apart from whether the United States has or has
not achieved post-racial status.217 But they may appeal to those who
are attracted to anticlassification theory yet who nonetheless find
continuing power in antisubordination arguments until we have
achieved post-racial success218—for example, those who are sympa-
thetic to claims of post-racial progress yet sensitive to the ways in
which race continues to matter.219
For example, consider the contentions in a complaint filed against
New Haven a few months after the Court’s decision in Ricci.220
Michael Briscoe, the plaintiff in that suit, is an African American
firefighter who received the top score of all candidates on the oral
exam for the position of Captain.221 If that had been the only
measure of merit, he would have been first in line to be promoted.
the social meaning of efforts like the Texas “Ten Percent Plan” or targeted recruitment plans
in expanding opportunities for those overlooked by traditional approaches, regardless of
protected class status. 
217. Some may also resist this Part’s characterization of such measures’ benefits, arguing
that disparate impact provisions encourage employers to modify their practices simply to
eliminate disparities rather than to take the time and trouble to figure out how to accurately
measure merit instead. See Marcus, supra note 23, at 64 (“An employer seeking to achieve a
particular racial outcome need only identify a racial disparity, locate a selection mechanism
that achieves the desired demographic mix, and identify whatever business necessities best
justify the mechanism. The tendency of disparate-impact law is to pressure employers to
effectuate quotas in just this manner.”). Plenty of examples to the contrary abound, as this
Part discusses. But even if it could be empirically proven, such an objection suggests that the
status quo’s inattention to merit in ways that exclude members of subordinated groups
remains preferable to inattention to merit in ways that do not. It is not clear why this would
be so.
218. As john powell has observed, “the post-racial proponents have not stated a justification
of when and why race should be considered in this post-racial world.” powell, supra note 3, at
799; see also Banks, supra note 3, at 54 (“[T]he idea of colorblindness is itself malleable,
subject to alternative formulations. One might view a commitment to colorblindness as
prohibiting only policies that differentiate among individuals on account of race in the
distribution of burdens or benefits. Alternatively, one might extend the colorblindness
principle to formally race neutral practices that are undertaken for a race related purpose.”).
219. See Po Bronson & Ashley Merryman, See Baby Discriminate, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 5,
2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/214989/ (describing social psychologists’ study
of parents’ reluctance to talk about race to their children because they want their children to
grow up color-blind, and children’s resulting struggles to make sense of their observations of
race).
220. See Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, Briscoe v. City
of New Haven, Civ. No. 3:09cv1642(CSH) (D. Conn. Nov. 2, 2009). 
221. Id. at 2.
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Similarly, if the oral exam had received a 70 percent weighting
—the norm for public safety agencies, according to Mr. Briscoe’s
complaint222 —he would have ranked fourth, and again would have
been eligible for promotion.223 Even if the written/oral weighting
were 40/60 respectively, rather than New Haven’s 60/40, he would
have been ranked ninth and thus remained eligible for promotion.224
Under the city’s 60/40 written/oral weighting, however, he ranked
twenty-fourth and was ineligible for advancement.225 
Mr. Briscoe alleged that the oral examination on which he
received the highest score required candidates to respond in detail
to real-life fire scenarios and personnel management situations and
thus tested not only job knowledge but also managerial and
leadership skills, in contrast to the multiple-choice written exam’s
focus on memorization.226 More specifically, he alleged that the 
differences between the written test and the oral exam disad-
vantaged a candidate, like the plaintiff, who had diligently
studied and learned all the material taught during years of on-
the-job experience and extensive in-service training, compared
to one who did little until the run-up to the exam but then
memorized the facts that were included in the assigned written
materials.227 
Mr. Briscoe offers a compelling counter-narrative to that of Mr.
Ricci—that of a hard-working African American firefighter who
excelled on what matters for success in firefighting leadership, only
to find that his employer did not value those qualities.228 In short,
although Mr. Ricci’s reliance interests are significant, they may not
be the only, and perhaps not the most important, reliance interests
implicated by New Haven’s actions in particular and by attention to
disparate impact generally. Under this view, attention to disparate
222. Id. at 6.
223. Id. at 4-6.
224. Id. 
225. Id. at 6.
226. Id. at 4-6.
227. Id. at 5-6.
228. For an extensive evaluation of the merits of a hypothetical lawsuit by minority
firefighters challenging New Haven’s tests, see Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 120, at 47-
48.
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impact coheres with equal protection values because it encourages
a more accurate measure of, and reward for, individual ability
regardless of protected class status by undermining unexamined yet
entrenched preferences. 
Even if one resists Mr. Briscoe’s narrative as yet to be proven,229
other illustrations abound that further this understanding of
disparate impact’s meaning as consistent with a commitment to
individual worth and dignity.230 One might similarly imagine,
without much effort, a white candidate with outstanding leadership
skills who nonetheless may never be identified as such because he
performs poorly on standardized tests. Indeed, the designer of the
New Haven tests conceded that the examinations did not attempt
to measure the critical job qualifications of command presence or
supervisory ability.231
Disparate impact provisions’ attention to unjustified disparities
also substantially enhances social welfare by improving the prac-
tices used to fill key positions in public safety and elsewhere.232 The
229. The federal district court dismissed Mr. Briscoe’s claim without reaching the merits,
ruling that the Ricci Court’s award of summary judgment to the plaintiffs necessarily
foreclosed any subsequent disparate impact challenge to the contested examinations. Briscoe
v. City of New Haven, No. 3:09-cv-1642, 2010 WL 2794212, at *8 (D. Conn. Apr. 28, 2010).
230. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
231. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, for example, quoted the testimony of test developer Chad
Legel that he had “never discussed with the City the propriety of the 60/40 weighting and ‘was
not asked to consider the possibility of an assessment center.’ The IOS exams, Legel admitted,
had not even attempted to assess ‘command presence’: ‘[Y]ou would probably be better off with
an assessment center if you cared to measure that.’” Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2706
(2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
232. Psychologists, for example, have found that decision makers frequently define merit
for specific jobs in ways “congenial to the idiosyncratic credentials of individual applicants
from desired groups, rather than necessarily attending to objective assessments of the jobs’
requirements.” Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria: Redefining
Merit To Justify Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474, 474 (2005); see also David Dunning,
Ann Leuenberger & David A. Sherman, A New Look at Motivated Inference: Are Self-Serving
Theories of Success a Product of Motivational Forces?, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 58,
58 (1995) (describing how individuals often define merit in a self-serving manner by
emphasizing criteria consistent with their own credentials); Michael I. Norton, Joseph A.
Vandello & John M. Darley, Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 817, 817 (2004) (finding that evaluators strategically emphasized certain
performance criteria to justify discriminatory decisions in hiring and admissions). For
example, one study found that evaluators strategically defined merit in a manner that favored
male over female applicants when hiring for the job of police chief. Uhlmann & Cohen, supra
at 476. Study participants emphasized the importance of education and experience when
evaluating a male candidate who had strong credentials in those areas, but devalued those
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disparate impact standard, for example, triggered reconsideration
of a wide range of promotion practices and other devices that failed
to accurately measure and predict candidates’ job performance.233
Too often employers relied on examinations and other devices
without ensuring that performance on those tests actually predicted
success on the job.234 Reconsidering practices that imposed racially
disparate impact led to the creation of selection instruments that
more accurately identified top performers. As just one example,
Title VII’s disparate impact provision spurred the development of
risk assessment centers that more accurately replicate real-world
emergency and management scenarios and thus better predict
same qualities when evaluating a male candidate who lacked them. Id.
233. See, e.g., Nash v. Consol. City of Jacksonville, 837 F.2d 1534, 1538 (11th Cir. 1988),
vacated and remanded, 490 U.S. 1103 (1989), Eleventh Circuit opinion reinstated on remand,
905 F.2d 355 (11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting a written promotional test after identifying the
complex behaviors required of a firefighting officer and concluding that none “is easily
measured by a written, multiple choice test”); Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667,
668 (3d Cir. 1983) (invalidating assignment and promotional practices that imposed a
disparate impact on the basis of race); Ensley Branch of NAACP v. Seibels, 616 F.2d 812, 822
(5th Cir. 1980) (invalidating examinations for police and firefighter positions that imposed a
disparate impact on the basis of race); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St.
Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 357 (8th Cir. 1980) (rejecting the validity of a multiple-choice
examination for promotion to firefighting jobs that do not depend “on any of the ... skills
associated with outstanding performance on a written multiple choice test”); Bradley v. City
of Lynn, 443 F. Supp. 2d 145, 149 (D. Mass. 2006) (invalidating municipalities’ written civil
service examination that imposed disparate impact against African Americans and Latinos
and was not job related and consistent with business necessity).
234. United States v. Vulcan Soc’y, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 77, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[I]t is
natural to assume that the best performers on an employment test must be the best people
for the job. But, the significance of these principles is undermined when an examination is not
fair. As Congress recognized in enacting Title VII, when an employment test is not adequately
related to the job for which it tests—and when the test adversely affects minority groups—we
may not fall back on the notion that better test takers make better employees. The City asks
the court to do just that. Regrettably, though, the City did not take sufficient measures to
ensure that better performers on its examinations would actually be better firefighters.”). For
another recent example of an examination proven to have created substantial disparate
impact without any meaningful tether to successful job performance, see Lewis v. City of
Chicago, No. 98 C5596, 2005 WL 693618, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2005). There the district
court concluded that the city had not proven that its test predicted firefighter performance,
and that the examination was instead “skewed towards one of the least important aspects of
the firefighter position at the expense of more important abilities.” Id. at *10. The court also
found that the cut-off score distinguishing the qualified from well-qualified pools was
“statistically meaningless.” Id. at *9. The city did not appeal those merits findings, instead
arguing only that the plaintiffs’ charge was not timely filed. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d
488, 490 (7th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court ultimately held that the plaintiffs’ charge was
timely. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010).
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public safety job performance than other forms of promotional
testing like multiple-choice tests.235
Attention to disparate impact similarly led to changes in employ-
ers’ physical ability tests that disproportionately excluded women
from firefighting and other traditionally male jobs without a demon-
strable connection to workforce quality. To be sure, firefighters and
other public safety officers must be strong and fit. But tests too
often rewarded candidates’ sprinting speed, even though many fire
departments “forbid sprinting” in practice because it is “fatiguing”
and may “exacerbat[e] smoke inhalation.”236 Other tests measured
only a certain level of isolated upper body strength, even though
successful firefighting requires full-body strength, agility, and
stamina.237 For these reasons, courts in a wide range of jurisdictions
have struck down public safety agencies’ ostensibly neutral physical
ability tests that disproportionately denied jobs to women without
any meaningful relationship to the jobs’ actual physical require-
ments.238 
Attention to disparate impact also inspired other jurisdictions to
make such changes on their own initiative. After carefully consider-
ing its physical ability tests, for example, Minneapolis developed
235. See Winfred Arthur Jr. et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Criterion-Related Validity of
Assessment Center Dimensions, 56 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 125, 145-46 (2003); Barbara B.
Gaugler, Meta-Analysis of Assessment Center Validity, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 493, 503
(1987); James R. Huck & Douglas W. Bray, Management Assessment Center Evaluations and
Subsequent Job Performance of White and Black Females, 29 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 13, 13-14
(1976).
236. Denise M. Hulett, Marc Bendick, Jr., Sheila Y. Thomas & Francine Moccio, Enhancing
Women’s Inclusion in Firefighting in the USA, 8 INT’L J. DIVERSITY ORGS., COMMUNITIES &
NATIONS 189, 198 (2008). 
237. Id.
238. See, e.g., Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 180 F.3d 468, 474-75 (2d Cir. 1999) (fire
department’s timed physical agility test that disproportionately excluded women violated
Title VII because city failed to prove that the passing score was job-related); Harless v. Duck,
619 F.2d 611, 616 (6th Cir. 1980) (police department’s physical ability test violated Title VII
because it disproportionately excluded women and the city failed to prove that the tested
exercises and passing scores were related to the physical requirements of the job); United
States v. City of Erie, 411 F. Supp. 2d 524, 568-70 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (police department’s
physical agility test that disproportionately excluded women was neither job-related nor
justified by business necessity); Thomas v. City of Evanston, 610 F. Supp. 422, 432 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (police department failed to justify its physical agility test that imposed a disparate
impact against women); Berkman v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 177, 179, 206 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) (fire department’s physical ability test that imposed disparate impact against women
violated Title VII because it was not sufficiently job-related). 
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new selection devices that advanced both merit standards and
equal opportunity. In the words of Fire Department Chief Rocco
Forte, “There’s no reason to lower your standards for diversity.
We’ve actually raised ours. There was no physical fitness tie to job
functions before. People could do sit-ups, but could they perform a
rescue?”239 In this way, attention to disparate impact spurred better
hiring for key public safety positions. 
To be sure, disparate impact has achieved antisubordination
goals at the same time.240 When Congress extended Title VII’s reach
to include state and local government employers in 1972, it
identified race discrimination by fire departments as among the
most pressing problems to be addressed.241 No woman, moreover,
had ever served as a paid firefighter in the United States before
the 1972 amendments that included fire departments—along with
other state and local governments—among the employers covered
by Title VII.242 But attention to disparate impact thereafter led to
the elimination of agencies’ height and weight standards and
other facially neutral requirements that disproportionately ex-
cluded women and people of color from a wide range of public safety
jobs without any demonstrable connection to successful job perfor-
mance.243 
239. Int’l Ass’n of Women in Fire & Emergency Servs., Minneapolis Walks the Walk,
http://www.i-women.org/archive_articles.php?article=24 (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
240. For a less optimistic view, see Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a
Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 753 (2006) (arguing that disparate impact doctrine has failed
to achieve substantial social change). 
241. 118 CONG. REC. 1817 (1972) (describing a series of discriminatory barriers to African
Americans’ entry into the firefighting corps). 
242. Hulett et al., supra note 236, at 191 (noting that no woman served as a paid firefighter
before 1973). Nor did public safety agencies hire women as firefighters in any significant
numbers until the 1980s. Id. The City of New Haven, for example, did not hire its first woman
firefighter until 1983. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 4, Broadnax v. City of New Haven, No.
04-2196-cv (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2004). 
243. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977) (striking down Alabama’s
height and weight requirements for correctional counselors because they disproportionately
excluded women without any showing of job-relatedness); Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211,
1228 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a sheriff’s department’s written promotion examination
violated Title VII because it disproportionately excluded women without any evidence of
business justification); Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1983) (concluding that a police
department’s height requirement imposed unjustified disparate impact on women in violation
of Title VII); Horace v. City of Pontiac, 624 F.2d 765, 768-69 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that a
police department’s height requirement imposed unjustified disparate impact in violation of
Title VII); Harless, 619 F.2d at 616-17 (concluding that a police department’s use of structured
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Many of those sympathetic to anticlassification arguments find
race-based classifications offensive in large part for fear that at-
tention to race will obscure what they see as more relevant aspects
of individual identity, like ability.244 They thus share a stake in
accurately selecting qualified candidates for leadership roles and
other important positions, rather than privileging unexamined
tradition over ability. Such a commitment to actual merit, however,
is undermined by a zero-sum understanding of equality that pro-
hibits decision makers from reconsidering what may be poor
measures of ability when racial or gender disparities trigger such
reconsideration. 
CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to examine the implications of a potentially
post-racial Court for equality law, rather than to add to the debate
over the current extent of our post-racial progress. Indeed, I find it
difficult to improve upon Professor Forde-Mazrui’s elegant response
to the post-racial claim: 
We cannot eliminate race from the American psyche until we
understand and eliminate the conditions that cause people to
make assumptions about others because of their race. Assuming,
optimistically, that racism no longer seriously impairs the life
oral interviews as a selection device was “rife with the potential for discrimination and is not
job-related” because the practice disproportionately disadvantaged women without any
relationship to actual job performance and was instead subject to a host of errors due to a lack
of standardized conditions and objective criteria); United States v. Virginia, 620 F.2d 1018,
1024 (4th Cir. 1980) (rejecting Virginia State Patrol’s height and weight requirement as
disproportionately excluding women without basis in business necessity in violation of Title
VII); United States v. City of Milwaukee, 481 F. Supp. 1162, 1164-65 (E.D. Wis. 1979)
(invalidating Milwaukee’s policy of hiring as paramedics only individuals who were also
Milwaukee firefighters when no woman had ever been hired as a Milwaukee firefighter:
“Paramedics seldom, if ever, perform firefighting duties (and are never relied upon to
extinguish fires) during their regular work week.”).
244. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (“One of the principal reasons race is
treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to
be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”); see also
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-95 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(characterizing the Equal Protection Clause as protecting a “‘personal right’[ ] to be treated
with equal dignity and respect” and thus “eliminating entirely from governmental
decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being’s race” (quoting Wygant v. Jackson,
476 U.S. 267, 320 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
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chances of racial minorities, we cannot ignore the social and
economic deprivations that do. These conditions, by their
example, do more than affirmative action to reinforce stereo-
types, justify racism, and thereby exacerbate racial tensions.
Worse, these conditions cause misery to those who must endure
them.245
Decades after concluding that the Equal Protection Clause does
not require that public employers reconsider their practices that
disproportionately disadvantage people of color so long as those
actions are not motivated by an interest in perpetuating racial
hierarchy,246 the Court has now concluded that Title VII forbids
them—and private employers too—from doing so under certain
circumstances. This may reflect the majority’s assumption of post-
racial success (at least in the employment context) that in turn
triggers a new, zero-sum understanding of equality—that is, that
“empathy” for disparities experienced by some groups is inevitably
accompanied by “prejudice” against others. If applied in the consti-
tutional setting, such an understanding of equality would, for the
first time and with potentially devastating results, treat with
suspicion a government decision maker’s attention to racial and
gender hierarchies when choosing among available policies and
programs.
Such a turn towards a zero-sum understanding of equality,
however, is by no means inevitable. Indeed, the Court’s recent
antidiscrimination decisions are also susceptible to a number of
alternative understandings, some with decidedly narrower implica-
tions than others. For example, the Court may view actions
motivated by a decision maker’s interest in ameliorating racial
disparities with suspicion only when those actions make identifiable
third parties worse off in tangible ways, because at that point—and
not until that point—it sees the costs of attending to race for
antisubordination ends as outweighing its benefits. 
Revisiting the social meaning of decision makers’ attention to
racial and gender hierarchies when choosing among various policy
options can remind us of such efforts’ win-win possibilities. Title
VII’s disparate impact provision, as just one example, bars practices
245. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 104, at 2397.
246. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39, 251-52 (1976).
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that impose racial and gender disparities only when those practices
cannot be justified as accurately measuring the qualities key to
successful job performance. By seeking to identify those people of all
protected classes who may not be recognized as productive because
of traditional yet unexamined assumptions, these provisions further
individual dignity and social welfare as well as antisubordination
values.
